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A. Seeking NATO Membership    
The importance of debates on whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization‟s 
membership is in the interests of Ukraine continues since the independence of Ukraine 
was declared and the country was pressured to become a non-nuclear state actor. 
Regardless of the well-established dialogue and close cooperation between NATO and 
Ukraine that were launched in 1991, “not a single election platform of any of Ukraine‟s 
political party or presidential candidate has ever declared NATO membership to be its or 
his/her goal” during the period of Ukraine‟s existence.
1
 Even the former pro-Western 
president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, did not mention Ukraine‟s NATO aspirations 
in his 2004 presidential election program.
2
 The case for Ukraine‟s admission to NATO 
notwithstanding, Yushchenko‟s intention was not on the government‟s immediate 
agenda. At least initially, it appeared that the Orange leader had played his game wisely 
and had given much more emphasis to the goal of the European Union. 
By the time of Mr. Yushchenko‟s inauguration, Ukraine‟s foreign policy was 
consciously directed at maintaining its neutrality and at pursuing the gradual integration 
into European institutions. In view of Ukraine‟s geostrategic position, the first two 
presidents of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, considered it in the 
interests of Ukraine to follow a multi-vector foreign policy as the country was still trying 
to get out from under the Russian influence. While successfully dealing with Russia and 
                                                          
1
 American Institute in Ukraine, “NATO and Ukraine’s Politicians: Time for Political Accountability,” 






being very cautious about the issue of Ukraine‟s membership in a Western military 
alliance, the Ukrainian political leadership was clear about the interest of Ukraine‟s 
prospective membership in the European Community. Further, a firm conviction was that 
increases in the standard of living of a nation's population could be reached through 
reciprocally advantageous relations with Russia, Asia, Latin American countries, and 
long-term cooperation with the Western World.
3
 To avoid aggravating relations with 
Russia, under the leadership of the first two presidents, Ukrainian diplomats stood firm in 
their demand to transform NATO from “collective defense organization into collective 
security organization, which would include Ukraine and Russia.”
4
 Considering the fact 
that the EU and NATO approach to Ukraine has not functioned as a part of coordinated 
Western policy, the question of whether to build the extensive all-European security 
system was repeatedly discussed in the various political circles.  
Having secured harmonious and friendly relations with Russia, during the 
Yeltsin's presidency in the second half of the 1990s, distinct interest groups started to see 
NATO membership as a stepping stone to membership in the EU. Furthermore, with  
Putin‟s ascent to power, significant part of Ukrainian political elite made public 
statements that Ukraine‟s neutrality is a temporary condition and Ukraine‟s incorporation 
into NATO is a long term-goal for a country that found itself caught between “its desire 
for stronger ties to the West and growing pressure”
5
 from the Russian Federation.
 
In order 
                                                          
3
 The concept of the “Western World” refers to the countries of Western and Central Europe, North 
America, Australia, New Zealand and now Baltic states. These countries are capitalistic, democratic and 
considered advanced. Very often the term “Western World” comes to be synonymous with the concept of 
“First World” which is also constructed term around the economic, political and cultural values of 
European/Western Civilization. In this context, several countries in Asia can be also considered as a part 
of the “Western World.” 
4
 Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine’s Balancing Act,” Survival 38, no.2 (Summer 1996):146.  
5
 Quoted in Ibid., 145. 
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to avoid offending Russia and complicating Ukraine‟s security dilemma, the first two 
presidents of Ukraine did not take any decisive policy action for NATO membership. 
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian politicians repeatedly stated that in case of deterioration of 
Russia-Ukraine relations, Ukraine “would have no choice but to strive to join NATO.”
6
 
Consequently, the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO permeates the entire 
history of Ukraine as an independent state and has always depended not only on the 
relations with Russia, but has been contingent on the interests of major political and 
economic powers. 
The 2004 presidential elections were momentous for Ukraine and the domestic 
political conflict between two parts of the state entirely reflected a geopolitical struggle 
between Russia and the Western World over the new Ukrainian state. With the wide scale 
of Western and Russian interference in the 2004 Ukrainian elections, the fiasco of the 
Moscow-backed candidate, in the 2004 presidential elections has been interpreted by 
many in East and West as a loss for Russia and as the triumph of the United States in 
Russia‟s backyard. The reaction of Russian politicians to this failure of Russia‟s plans for 
Ukraine made clear that the Kremlin had underestimated the domestic political 
environment in Ukraine. There were indications that Moscow would not accept loss of its 
control and dominance over the post-Soviet space. The aggressive tone of the Russian 
leadership certified that in Russia‟s foreign policy as well as in the Western world, 
geopolitical interests are positioned much higher than essential political values.  
                                                          
6
 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine: NATO Relationship,” Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, 




While there were no doubts about the corruption and fraud in the Ukrainian 
presidential elections, there was clear evidence of the U.S. government supporting regime 
change through support from the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, 
and private philanthropists such as George Soros to help the opposition and pro-
democracy groups to overturn the government by using mass protests. Yushchenko‟s 
electoral triumph had little to do with the development of the “civil-society,” but 
replicated analogical Western interventions in Georgia, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova or Serbia.
7
 It does not necessarily signify that people of Ukraine have chosen a 
Western rather than Eastern path of the political and social development. Looking back, it 
can be said that prior to Yushchenko‟s rise to power, the majority of the population of 
Ukraine favored close relations with the Russian Federation, even at the expense of close 
relations with the United States. The false choice between “authoritarian” Russia and the 
“democratic” West, imposed on the people of Ukraine, was designed to shift the country 
westward and launched a series of events aimed at bringing the post-Soviet country under 
the West's increasing influence and domination.
8
 
The Ukraine‟s so-called “Orange Revolution” in 2004 was crucial factor 
influencing the Ukraine‟s foreign policy and consequently the process of Ukraine‟s 
incorporation in Euro-Atlantic security arrangement.
9
 The newly-elected government of 
the country of 46 million people demonstratively prioritized relations with the West over 
Russia. The integration into the European Union, membership in the World Trade 
Organization and the incorporation of Ukraine into the Western military apparatus have 
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 Konstantin Kilibarda, “The Ukrainian elections: a dangerous fairy-tale,” The Kole’s Blog, entry posted 




 Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no.3 (Summer 2006):89. 
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been selected and established as major foreign policy objectives. Three years after Victor 
Yushchenko became president, with the strongly reiterated support of the United States, 
Ukraine was approved for admission to the WTO.  In terms of Ukraine‟s membership to 
the EU, good progress has also been made. However, despite a great number of 
significantly important agreements in numerous areas of cooperation, the EU has always 
been sufficiently clear that it has no plans to offer Ukraine  “membership for now and 
instead would propose closer economic and political ties, including greater collaboration 
on energy policy and a free trade agreement.”
10
  
The implementation of the policy of aligning Ukraine with Europe and the United 
States has undoubtedly damaged the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. 
Specifically, Ukraine‟s strategic goal to join the European Union and NATO in 
combination with its border and gas disputes with Russia, interpretation of Soviet-era 
history, and the question of one of the Russia‟s biggest naval bases in Crimea has 
substantially contributed to the deterioration in relations between the two post-Soviet 
republics. Consequently, in a period of great political instability in Ukraine against the 
background of the mutual political intimidation and blackmail between two neighboring 
countries, the government of Ukraine found an opportunity to move from empty rhetoric 
to concrete action, and finally took a decision to apply for NATO membership.  
According to the perception of Ukraine‟s pro-NATO forces, Ukraine‟s 
membership in Euro-Atlantic Alliance could significantly ensure the country‟s defense 
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 Dan Bilefsky, “Ukraine to pursue EU entry,” New York Times, September 14, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/world/europe/14iht-ukraine.2811837.html (accessed September 




against external pressure and consequently enhance the deteriorating security of the 
country. In the judgments of Ukraine‟s analysts and intellectuals, membership in the 
Euro-Atlantic security arrangement, based on the conception that no country 
encountering a threat should be left to confront it alone, is the best guarantee to Ukraine‟s 
independence and integrity.
11
 In January 2008, the Ukrainian government confronting the 
low level of public support for joining the Western military organization sent an open 
letter to NATO asking Ukraine to be considered for a Membership Action Plan.
12
 
Although the official NATO position proclaims that Ukraine will become a full-fledged 
member of the alliance, under the pressure from Russia and because of the internal 
conditions of Ukraine, this has been postponed until an undecided future  date.  
B. Return to “Multi-Vector” Foreign Policy? 
In the wake of Russia‟s invasion of Georgia, Ukraine‟s membership in Western 
military alliance seemed inevitable. However, while the conflict between Russia and 
Georgia was the precise reason for the United States and Eastern Europe to bring Ukraine 
into NATO, Western European leaders felt that Russian invasion was legitimate and 
insisted that further extension of NATO would provoke Russia and would make Kremlin 
more aggressive. Therefore, major European powers‟ unwillingness to see Ukraine as 
                                                          
11
 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 states that: “The Parties 
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, 
to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”  Available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed June 21, 2011). 
12
 Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine’s Top Three Leaders Request NATO Membership Action Plan,” Eurasia Daily 
Monitor 5, no. 10 (2008), http://www.jamestown.org/si......x_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33304 (accessed 
September 12, 2009).  
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NATO ally derives from their reluctance to deteriorate relations with Russia on which 
Western Europe is massively dependent for its supplies of energy resources. The truth is 
that there are too many differences among the interests of NATO members and it would 
not have been rational for the countries of Western Europe to jeopardize their own 
economic and political position in order to get Ukraine into NATO.  Clearly, the refusal 
to grant Ukraine the Membership Action Plan at the ministerial meeting in December 
2008, despite intense lobbying from former U.S. President, George H. W. Bush, indicated 
the differences over the understanding of the nature of security and clearly demonstrated 
a lack of a unified perception of threat. In sum, the costs of legitimacy of Ukraine‟s 
incorporation into NATO have become too high which in its turn explains why the 
expectations of Ukrainian government have not been fulfilled yet.    
Besides, domestic political infighting and Ukrainian public opposition against 
joining NATO has been a crucial obstacle for Ukraine to meet the necessary criteria for 
NATO membership. Ukrainian society has always been divided on the issue of NATO 
membership. In fact, while Western European leaders exhibit patience and are not willing 
to antagonize Russia which views the expansion of NATO as a hostile action, 
Yushchenko‟s push for NATO membership in the absence of public approval not only 
engendered fears of a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but further divided 
Ukrainian society. In this context, the issue of NATO membership has served to 
emphasize the political divisions of the post-Soviet country. Pro-NATO sentiments have 
been widely present in the western and central part of Ukraine, whereas the strong 
opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO from the Russian-speaking east and south 
of the Ukrainian state has only increased the complexity of the issue. In spite of the 
8 
 
numerous pro-NATO information campaigns launched by the government of Ukraine, 
the majority of the population, being united in support of integration into the European 
Union, has categorically objected to Ukraine‟s membership in Euro-Atlantic collective 
defense pact. It is also important to mention that for the most part the opposition to 
NATO among Ukrainians is formed by the stereotypes produced by the Soviet political 
propaganda.  
As Victor Yanukovych became a president in 2010, he dropped NATO 
membership bid from Ukraine's agenda, insisting that Ukraine is not ready to join the 
Atlantic Alliance and arguing that NATO conditions require the Ukrainian public to 
claim ownership over the consensus of Ukrainian membership in the Alliance. From the 
public rhetoric of Yanukovych after coming to power, it has become clear that the 
president will not do anything for Ukraine`s Euro-Atlantic integration in the nearest 
future and Ukraine is determined to pursue the policy of non-alignment as the central 
guidance point in the security sphere. Specifically, several times Yanukovych 
acknowledged that membership in NATO would be put to the Ukrainian electorate once 
the country had gone through political and economic reforms.
13
 Practically speaking, the 
question of the country's accession to the North-Atlantic Alliance, with Ukraine‟s eastern 
and southern parts being more committed to good relations with Russia, had gone away 
as quickly as it was raised after the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko's election. 
 Without doubt, Ukraine‟s adoption of non-aligned status is a great achievement. 
First of all, abandoning Ukraine‟s drive towards the membership in Western military bloc 
                                                          
13




entirely represents the Ukrainian people‟s will. Secondly, Yanukovych's public position 
on NATO signifies a wise move to repair the negative effect of the radical change in the 
ethnic identity of Ukraine after the events of the Orange Revolution. Finally, the 
Yanukovych‟s non-alignment strategy contributed not only to the stability of the country, 
but has done a great deal to change the European security calculus. A neutral Ukraine 
diminishes the risk of entrapping NATO members and Ukraine itself into military 
confrontation with Russia. However, the only question is how long the leadership of 
Ukraine will be able to coordinate policy between Russia and the West and 
simultaneously play hard with the population of 46 million people.   
C. The Construction of Consent or Simply a Role in “Reset”?  
Although the current leadership of Ukraine overturned the previous government‟s 
pro-NATO drive, the U.S. – led military alliance continues to be interested in Ukraine. 
While Bush‟s administration was trying to draw Ukraine away from Russian influence by 
encouraging it to join NATO at any cost, under the Obama administration, the idea of 
Ukrainian membership in NATO has become attached to further deepening of relations 
with the North-Atlantic Alliance and promotion of political, economic and military 
reforms and at the same time maintaining good relations with Russia. In fact, since the 
United States and NATO publicly welcomed Ukraine to the Alliance should the 
government of Ukraine change its mind, it has become apparent that the West and 
particularly the United States remains interested in the new government‟s undertaking of 
economic reforms and its commitments to democracy. Concerns about Russia‟s 
determination to use force to protect its geopolitical interests and Washington‟s ambition 
to “reset” relations with Moscow led to the reformulation of U.S. foreign policy in the 
10 
 
region and thereby to an adjustment in its Ukraine policies. Undoubtedly, by publicly 
suspending support for Ukrainian membership in NATO, after years of tensions, the 
Obama administration succeeded in establishment of broad and positive relationship with 
Russia.  
 On the other hand, conversations about Ukraine‟s non-aligned status are not 
confirmed and there are no specific moves in a direction of its acknowledgement.
14
 I 
argue that the agreement between Ukraine and Russia concerning the 25-year extension 
for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea is not simply a complication for Ukraine‟s 
non-aligned movement, but a clever political move to reset relations with Russia and 
further enhance bilateral cooperation of Ukraine and NATO. In contrast to the approach 
of former president of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, who championed a speedy NATO 
membership for Ukraine at the expense of Ukrainian-Russian relations, Yanukovych 
recognizes that the issue of Ukraine‟s Euro-Atlantic integration creates a division in 
society, contributes to political and economic instability and therefore is one of the main 
cornerstones of advancement of positive image of Yanukovych.  
While Yushchenko used a security approach to obtain access to NATO 
membership, Yanukovych appeals to Western constitutive values and norms. In fact, 
references to low public support for Ukraine‟s membership in NATO are used by 
Ukrainian government to justify the country‟s non-aligned status. Based on Frank 
Schimmelfennig‟s analysis, the proper use of “rhetorical action” strategy is the main 
                                                          
14
 Vikno.EU, “The NATO in Foreign Policy of Ukraine,” Vikno EU news Web Site, March 10, 2011, 
http://vikno.eu/eng/politics/politics/the-nato-in-foreign-policy-of-ukraine.html (accessed April 11, 2011).  
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factor that accounts for NATO‟s enlargement decisions.
15
 Thus, while Yanukovych aims 
at shaping the public attitude towards Euro-Atlantic integration, he strategically uses the 
rhetoric in order to represent that Ukraine is making tremendous strides toward 
democratization and adoption of liberal values and norms. Therefore, I argue that through 
a process of “rhetorical action” in regard to the issue of Ukraine‟s joining NATO, 
Yanukovych is cleverly stabilizing the country and is creating the conditions for a more 
consistent political and economic strategy which in the sphere of mutual relations with 
NATO is the de facto continuation of a Yushchenko‟s policy.
16
 
 In this context, it is very important to remember that Ukraine‟s joining Alliance 
was on Yanukovych‟s agenda when serving as Ukraine‟s Prime Minister in Kuchma‟s 
government before the 2004 Orange Revolution. Considering that several times 
Yanukovych has shifted his rhetoric in regard to the Ukraine‟s membership in NATO, it 
becomes clear that anti-NATO sentiment has always been nothing else than a key 
instrument of electoral propaganda in the internal struggle for political power.
17
 There 
should be no doubt that in a political struggle against former Orange forces, anti-NATO 
position of Yanukovych guaranteed him support from Russia and played a vital role in 
his electoral victory. Soon, after becoming president, Yanukovych formally fulfilled his 
                                                          
15
 See Frank Schimmelfenning, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
16
 For more on the idea that Ukraine’s “rhetorical action” is the crucial factor that explains the delay to 
join the Membership Action Plan of NATO, see Oleksandr Svitych, “Ukraine and NATO: The Failure of 
Rhetorical Action” (MA Thesis, Central European University, 2008).  
17
 Lyudmyla Pavlyuk and Adrian Erlinger, “NATO and Ukraine: Elites’ Actions, Public Perception, and 
Polarization,” Merydian – Centre of Informational Researches, http://www.merydian.info/nato.html 
(accessed April 12, 2011). 
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campaign promise to abandon the pursuit of NATO membership.
18
 However, in reality 
the foreign policy of Ukraine remains rigidly Westernized and according to a great 
number of political analysts, practical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO has only 
increased. In fact, this policy of Yanukovych is not only consistent with a new strategic 
concept of NATO, which postpones any real decisions on the issues of the Alliance‟s 
enlargement in the coming years, but calls for the deepening of cooperation between 
NATO and its partners. 
  As of today, NATO and Ukraine continue to cooperate in the frame of the 
Annual National Program which “sets out a very active program of cooperation with 
defense reform, good governance and dealing with corruption.”
19
 Furthermore, with 
Ukraine‟s and NATO‟s commitment to cooperate in the implementation of wide-ranging 
domestic reforms, Ukraine continues to take part in joint military exercises with NATO 
forces. As a matter of fact, it is well-known that NATO is ready to draw Ukraine into a 
conversation about the deployment of missile defense system in Europe. It is remarkable 
that despite Ukraine‟s current neutral status, NATO officials publicly express their beliefs 
that ultimately Ukraine will join the Alliance.
20
 Therefore, I argue that in the public 
sphere the present Ukrainian government removed membership in the North-Atlantic 
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 “Dvulikij Janus Ukrainskoj Politiki: Ukraina i NATO – Shagi k Sotrudnichestvu ili Put' v Nikuda?” 
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 Yuriy Onyshkiv, “NATO's Robert Simmons: ‘We Believe at Some Stage Ukraine Will be a Member of 
NATO’,” Kyiv Post, October 11, 2010, http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/85918/ (accessed 





Alliance from the list of foreign policy goals, but in practice Ukraine‟s cooperation with 
NATO continues to be active, comprehensive, and, in fact, intensified.
21
  
D. Mixed Policy Motives for NATO Enlargement 
Although the analysis of alliance theory is not the focus of this work, within the 
context of international relations theory the motives for alliance formation are clear. It is 
important to remember that NATO‟s formation in 1949 and the first fifty years of its 
existence were closely associated with the period of Cold War in terms of the 
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West. It is generally accepted that the 
main purpose of the Atlantic Alliance was the containment of the Communist expansion 
to the Western Europe and its activity should be examined as a response to the Soviet 
threat. In terms of a theoretical study of alliances, it can be said that the existence of 
NATO until the end of the Cold War, with its essential function of consolidating NATO 
area countries‟ strength, has been grounded mainly on the realist/neorealist philosophies 
of international relations and has possessed a security and strategic character.
22
 In 
particular, if the U.S. security guarantees to Western Europe, brought under the 
provisions of the Marshall Plan, were considered extremely significant to America‟s 
economic and strategic interests, membership in NATO for the European countries 
reassured them that their status and sovereignty would be strengthened against 
prospective Soviet aggression. Thus, seeking protection from Soviet expansionism on the 
part of the weaker European states and the behavior of the major power‟s interest 
                                                          
21
 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “NATO- Ukraine Cooperation Less Politicized, But as Active,” Media 
Centre, 2011 Press Releases, July 7, 2011, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2523 
(accessed August 22, 2011).  
22
 Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 
(Summer 1996): 445-475. 
14 
 
complemented each other and resulted in an integrated military organization with a 
clearly identified opponent. As a consequence, NATO emerged as an “alliance concluded 
between elites with totally different ends but sharing a similar view of means.”
23
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and disappearance of the Soviet 
threat, the organization‟s historic objective of balancing a rising Soviet power had been 
achieved and the issue of the persistence of NATO in a post-Cold War world has become 
of critical importance. The immediate response was the plan by the United States to 
enlarge NATO membership into Eastern and Central Europe.  Since then, the Alliance 
has taken steps to advance its reach not only to former Warsaw Pact countries but to three 
former Soviet Baltic states. Contrary to the expectations about the Alliance‟s lack of 
relevance in a post-Cold War world, “NATO has added to the list of functions it is 
prepared to carry out, broadened its ties to other countries and organizations, and is 
working to expand its membership.”
24
 Recently, despite Russian objections to the 
organization‟s expansion into former Soviet republics, NATO offered to strengthen 
military and political cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia to achieve a goal of eventual 
membership.  
While they expressed recognition of general security concerns, the majority of 
Central and East European political leaders on their road to NATO membership “avoided 
publicly identifying specific potential enemies” and argued that regional instability rather 
than a traditional military threat from specific source had been the main reason for their 
                                                          
23
 Ernst B. Haas and Allen Suess Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1956), 160. 
24
 McCalla, “NATO's Persistence after the Cold War,” 446. 
15 
 
countries to join the military alliance.
25
 According to Ted Galen Carpenter, such an 
argument has always been deceitful and has indicated at a conflict between the elite's 
interpretation of state interests and the objectives they wished to attain with NATO 
membership.
26
 Taking into consideration certain declarations by Central and East 
European politicians, security factors alone did not move their countries to join NATO, 
but concerns of national identity have played a significant role in the formulation of each 
country‟s foreign policy. 
 Furthermore, during the period of Cold War NATO was an obvious illustration of 
realist/neorealist philosophy in practice. As a result, the Alliance‟s involvement in the 
Balkans, the attachment of NATO membership to continued domestic reforms and the 
interplay between the goals and interests of member, applicant and partner states have 
hinted at the limitations of the realist/neorealist theory as an explanation of NATO 
mission. It is proper to say that the leadership of Ukraine has not considered NATO 
solely in military terms and has been mindful that democracy and free markets could be 
consolidated by Ukraine‟s membership in Western military alliance. Moreover, it is wise 
to remember that NATO has been considered by the government of Ukraine to be a 
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E. Importance and Objective of Study 
At the time when the internal debate concerning the question of Ukraine‟s seeking 
NATO integration is alive, the geopolitical position of Ukraine as a buffer zone between 
traditional East and West contributes multiple levels of entanglement to the issue.  As 
stated by Hall Gardner, the fact is that “a contemporary, unstable Ukraine is the key 
European pivotal state like Poland in the interwar period.”
28
 This increasing vulnerability 
and the restless call of the United States to extend NATO's territorial jurisdiction further 
east can lead to the geopolitical conflict. Consequently, Ukraine joining NATO may in 
fact decrease its security. Indeed, the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO affects the 
course of events in the system of international relations, and thereby demonstrates the 
need for a critical analysis of the issue of Ukraine‟s integration in North-Atlantic 
Alliance.  
While the Ukrainian government argues for the benefits of NATO membership, 
several perspectives in international relations show that despite the benefits that Ukraine 
expects to derive from NATO membership, it is unwise for Ukraine to pursue 
membership. While the pro-NATO forces in Ukraine do not consider the Alliance in 
exclusively military terms, the strengthening of Ukraine‟s position vis-à-vis Russia and 
protection against a possible Russian threat has been always seen as the main value of 
NATO membership for Ukraine. A heightened fear of being caught in a revived form of 
Russian influence and an exaggerated perception of the possibility of military conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine is behind the pursuit of a pro-NATO strategy. In this thesis, 
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I show that NATO enlargement should be viewed not as a measure to maintain regional 
stability, but needs to be examined in a more complex geopolitical, cultural and economic 
context. It is only through challenging the security advantage of Ukraine‟s joining NATO 
that it is possible to understand that an endeavor to turn Ukraine into NATO member is 
not advanced by Ukraine‟s security concerns. Ultimately, it needs to be acknowledged 
that NATO‟s mission has changed beyond its military goals, and NATO‟s expansion 
should be discussed from a much broader standpoint than of strategic alignments.  
This work seeks to demonstrate that through the context of discursive 
construction of multiple challenges for the security of Ukraine, proponents of Ukrainian 
adherence to NATO have been actively lobbying for Ukrainian membership into the 
Alliance. It was very clear during the presidency of Yushchenko, who was supported by 
the majority of Ukrainian-speaking population, when Russia gained a central focus in the 
discursive construction of Ukrainian security concerns. Since Yanukovych came to 
power, the Russian-Ukrainian relations have improved and the reasoning to look for the 
Western security guarantees and assistance against Russia was abandoned. While 
Yanukovych has been clear that the issue of Ukrainian incorporation in NATO may 
“emerge at some point,”
29
 the movement to official bringing of Ukraine into NATO has 
started to be grounded not on the idea of strengthening Ukraine, but on the adherence to 
transform Ukraine into a democratic state with a flourishing market economy. 
Second, in exploring the idea of Western proponents having few security concerns 
about Russia, I develop an analysis that allows seeing Ukrainian adherence to NATO as a 
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way of disciplining Ukraine to neoliberal agenda of global capitalist system. I argue that 
membership in NATO means signing on for a wide range of political institutions and 
neoliberal economic policies prescribed by the Western governments. The issue of 
Ukraine‟s joining NATO will be incorporated into the idea that the economic force 
causes the main change in the system of international relations and with it consolidates 
unjust political and socio-economic system. It is very problematic to repudiate that 
present-day societies, including Ukrainian, are structured around global capital and 
production accumulation.
30
 People all over the world remain exploited by corporate 
capitalist elites, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union neoliberal capitalism continues 
its expansion as the hegemonic force. 
In Ukraine like in other developing countries a new type of the economic system, 
far from natural, has been organized and which operates through different separate 
institutions. Such an institutional arrangement is not able to function unless society is 
shaped and subordinated in a way as to allow structure to operate according to its own 
laws.
 31
 Imperial domination, considered to be the highest stage in capitalist development, 
no longer needs the support of ideology and brutal force to keep the population cowed, 
but contends to control the societies through a passive consumerism and a policy of 
systematical depersonalization. Ukrainian society turned into the actor in the capitalist 
system, and membership in NATO will lock into a policy behavior with real inability to 
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take control of its own local interests, and through which capitalist hegemon pursues its 
economic and geopolitical interests.
32
  
This thesis aims at a critical study of Ukraine‟s possible integration in the Euro-
Atlantic security space and develops an argument against Ukraine‟s incorporation into 
NATO. My argument is that by joining NATO, Ukraine may well become predisposed to 
undertake a course of action that will not serve the interests of the people of Ukraine. 
Drawing upon the relationship between NATO expansion and the extension of Western 
colonialism, I claim that incorporation of Ukraine into NATO will deprive the 
government of Ukraine of its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy, and will 
make Ukrainians completely dependent on the decisions and policies of the Western 
world. Even now, before Ukraine‟s incorporation into the Western concert, we are 
witnessing the government ignoring the will of the majority of the population.  
The main purpose of this research is to better understand the issue of Ukraine‟s 
incorporation in NATO and the complexity of the world through arguments against 
Ukraine‟s joining NATO. The thought developed in my thesis will be that NATO is an 
instrument of the United States, as the hegemonic power of the capitalist world-economy, 
to expand neoliberal hegemonic ideology and fully integrate Ukraine into global 
economy. To be sure, this thesis contributes to the idea that NATO should be examined 
as an achievement of the U.S. foreign policy and in the context of the U.S. promotion of 
international capitalist order. The project views the process of Ukraine‟s incorporation 
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into NATO as part of the neoliberal structural adjustment to reconstruct the political, 
economic and social order in the post-Soviet country to serve the geostrategic and 
economic interests of the United States. Thus, NATO expansion and incorporation of 
Ukraine with U.S. military presence as well as strategic and political commitments 
should be seen from the perspective of American political interests.  
F. Project Overview 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter one provides an overview of Ukraine-
NATO relations. This introductory part of my thesis clearly demonstrates that the process 
of Ukraine‟s integration in North-Atlantic Alliance has been always shaped by the 
interaction of geopolitical and economic interests of international actors in the region. 
Furthermore, this chapter develops an idea that despite the adoption of the non-aligned 
neutral status by Ukraine during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, the cooperation 
of Ukraine and Alliance has not stopped, but has only intensified. While Ukraine was 
rejected the Membership Action Plan in 2008, the process of Ukraine‟s incorporation into 
Alliance continues in the frame of the Annual National Program that is considered to be 
part of the first cycle of the NATO Membership Action Plan.
33
 This point is extremely 
important in the context of motivation and interests of all actors involved in the process 
of NATO enlargement and bringing Ukraine into NATO. By focusing on the mixed 
policy motives for Ukraine‟s collaboration with NATO and questioning the prevailing 
idea that Ukraine‟s Euro-Atlantic integration continues for security and defense concerns, 
                                                          
33
 Denis Kiriukhin, “NATO – Ukraine: Membership not in Shape but Essence,” in EuroDialogueXXI, 
http://eurodialogue.org/NATO%20–%20Ukraine-Membership-not-in-Shape-but-Essence (accessed 




I formulate my position against Ukraine‟s joining NATO and intend to make a 
contribution to the debate over the potential membership of Ukraine in Alliance.  
While the benefits and positive aspects of Ukraine‟s possible membership in 
NATO are known and widely discussed from the standpoint of looking for the ways to 
guarantee Ukraine's security, the negative aspects, associated with the incorporation of 
Ukraine into the broader capitalist and liberal-democratic space of Western Europe and 
North America, are largely unknown and remain to be unquestioned. Chapter two 
demonstrates that in my thesis I am determined to provide an analysis of the process of 
Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO which employs a methodology based on critical 
approach. Despite the fact that it is not possible to define a critical approach specifically, 
it offers “a distinct methodological strategy and a unique research program.”
34
 It should 
be taken into account that the project of critical theory does not reject any other theories, 
opinions and approaches, but incorporates all of them into studying and explaining of our 
social and political reality.  
Making use of the critical approach, chapter two introduces theoretical grounding 
for the idea that the issue of Ukraine‟s joining NATO should be analyzed within the 
context of the world-system. Immanuel Wallerstein‟s ideas help us to understand that the 
structure of the international system is based on world capitalist economy, and capitalism 
is a “force that had to be understood in global rather than local terms - which means that 
emancipation must be a global project.”
35
 Armed with the understanding that the 
development of U.S. hegemony led to reconstruction of global political economy, the 
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reader is directed to the neo-Gramscian idea of global social order with the hegemony of 
the United States which operates through various social relations, international 
institutions and culture. While I recognize limitations of these two distinct theories and 
their deficiency towards certain positions, I use them in building my argument and 
mainly for the purpose of rethinking the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation in NATO. At 
the risk of suffering from a great deal of theoretical pluralism, it should be clear that 
research methodology that adopts critical theory which in its turn, allows an assessment 
of different claims and adoption of certain theoretical assumptions, is necessary.  
Chapter three challenges the main argument for Ukraine joining NATO based on 
claim that Ukraine would be given collective defense guarantees by the members of the 
military Alliance and thereby would significantly improve its security environment and 
position vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, incorporation of Ukraine into NATO will in fact 
decrease its security.
36
 Russian reaction to Kiev‟s NATO aspirations means that bilateral 
relations would suffer to a greater extent if Ukraine joined the Western military alliance 
without Russia. Furthermore, the chapter seeks to demonstrate the problems and 
limitations of the realist/neorealist point of view, with its focus on balancing against 
perceived threats, and indicate that NATO enlargement into Ukraine should not be 
viewed as a measure to ensure Ukraine‟s independence and integrity. Above all, the 
purpose of this chapter is to understand the security and identity discourses through 
which Ukraine‟s integration into NATO takes place. 
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Chapter four examines NATO in exclusively economic and political terms. It 
suggests that NATO has been institutionally transformed from a military to a multilateral 
organization. Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter is not to explore the issue of 
Ukrainian membership in NATO specifically, but to indicate that political authority 
structure for the global economy, social and political life is organized around various 
forms of consensus formation in favor of neoliberal disciplinary governance. While this 
chapter elaborates on the mechanisms of the global economy, it offers an understanding 
of how NATO, as one of the numerous tools of exercising power, plays an active role in 
“the rearrangement of political systems in the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones of the 
„world-system‟ so as to secure the underlying objective of maintaining essentially 
undemocratic societies inserted into an unjust international system.”
37
 The philosophy of 
Antonio Gramsci and the works of critical theorists constitute a fundamentally important 
development of my argument and demonstrate how the process of Ukraine‟s 
incorporation into NATO is linked to the developments of the capitalist economy. 
In chapter five I will focus on the analysis of the evolution of neoliberalism by 
considering the essential connections between the notions of imperialism and neo-
colonialism, in order to prove that NATO is part of a mechanism whose strategic aim is 
to extend the particular form of social and political control of Western bloc over the rest 
of the world. As part of the argument that Ukrainian membership in NATO is not in the 
interests of Ukrainian people, the chapter points to the relationship between neoliberal 
globalization and particular form of governmentality. In this sense, my argument builds 
on the idea that the steady performance of free markets depends upon thoughtful and 
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comprehensive regulation which lies in the provision of domestic and international 
stability through international interdependence and cooperation.
38
 As well as other 
international organizations, NATO participates in the process of the conversion of the 




In concluding the thesis, chapter six reconsiders the information analyzed in the 
previous chapters and confirms my argument against Ukraine joining NATO. The 
evidence in the research clearly demonstrates that Ukraine‟s move toward NATO 
membership is not driven by the security interests of Ukrainian state. It will become clear 
that the issue of Ukraine‟s potential membership in the Alliance should be analyzed from 
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE OF THE 
STUDY 
A. Methodology 
Central to my thesis is the idea that the current Ukrainian leadership pursues the 
same political goals of EU and NATO memberships as former presidents. The previous 
introductory chapter has shown that in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration Viktor 
Yanukovych prefers more cautious approach. In contrast to Yushchenko, Yanukovych, 
whose loyal political base is pro-Russian electorate in eastern and southern Ukraine, is 
not able to play to anti-Russian nationalism to get Ukraine into NATO. In order for his 
government to look legitimate it is necessary to be perceived as acting in the interests of 
the entire population. However, if Ukraine continues to modernize its armed forces and 
persists in adapting its legislation to international standards, the necessary measures to 
deal with Russian pressure and to influence public opinion will be applied as soon as 
political consensus in the West on Ukrainian membership in NATO is reached. The 
events of Ukraine's Orange Revolution at the end of 2004 have shown that through 
various methods of manipulation it has become possible to mobilize the masses of people 
towards government‟s desired objective in a very short period of time. 
Certainly, this assertion challenges and contradicts the dominant view about the 
world of international relations and Ukrainian politics. However, I seek to question 
widespread ideas, certain rules and norms, imposed knowledge and practices. To many 
people it may appear that my argument is anti-American or even pro-Russian, however, 
in reality I seek to look at the process of Ukraine‟s integration into NATO from the 





 While the debate on Ukraine‟s joining NATO from a realist/neorealist point of 
view is widespread and has increasing acceptance, there are many issues related to 
identity politics that cannot be explained by the mainstream international relations theory. 
Moreover, while this thesis does not make a claim to objectivity or universalism, it is 
necessary to “think critically and reflectively about how particular values, assumptions 
and concepts are used to describe the current social „reality‟ and possible alternatives.”
41
 
Therefore, realizing that discussions on this topic are mainly based on orthodox 
paradigms and being convinced that knowledge and beliefs about everything in the world 
are tied to certain discursive contexts, I am very interested in a critical approach that 
allows communication between different theoretical paradigms.
42
 In my case, the answers 
to the questions that I ask are not to be discovered by one or two theoretical approaches, 
“but by ethical reasoning conducted through dialogue”
43
 across realist/neorealist, 
postmodern, structural, postcolonial, constructivist, liberal/neoliberal perspectives. 
Thus, I would like to emphasize my methodology of engagement across numerous 
theoretical approaches. For example, the study opens with an analysis of realist/neorealist 
approach to the issue of NATO enlargement and Ukraine‟s incorporation in the Alliance. 
Examining the realist/neorealist formulation offers us not only a better understanding of 
Ukraine‟s motivations for joining NATO, but also expands our vision of how Russia can 
behave in conditions that are threatening to its national interest or survival. Nevertheless, 
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while the literature on alliances has been traditionally realist or neorealist in orientation, 
the motives of policymakers of prospective or recently submitted member states as well 
as disagreements between the United States and other NATO members makes us turn to 
additional theoretical approaches in international relations.
44
 Clearly, liberal and 
constructivist theoretical insights applied in this work help us to see the “nature of the 
consensus that provides the basis for stability and order in international society.”
45
 The 
fact that much of the explanation about NATO‟s continuation after the Cold War derives 
from non-realist schools of international relations theory reinforces the idea that none of 
the paradigms of international relations can fully account for NATO‟s subsequent 
developments since the end of the Cold War.
46
 
Being Ukrainian, it is twice as difficult for me to give an unbiased analysis of the 
situation surrounding the Ukraine‟s membership in NATO. Nevertheless, I am very 
interested in thoughtful research and strive “to stand outside prevailing structures, 
processes, ideologies, and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations 
derive from particular political/theoretical/historical perspectives.”
47
 This is important to 
understand as from my personal standpoint, to stand outside means to have a room for 
various thoughts and ideas contradicting and rejecting each other, but at the same time to 
have an ability to find logic, reason and see the purpose of each of them. To be 
considered from outside means to have an ambition to open that outside world to others, 
to be a force for change. Finally, being from outside should be rational, based on 
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experience and practice of application of knowledge in the real world, today‟s world, real 
time.
48
 The structure of my thesis follows a pattern that “allows us to analyze countries 
such as Ukraine not as unique cases with no parallels in the world but as cases that can 
fruitfully be compared and contrasted with others.”
49
 Ultimately, the emancipatory 
interest is of main concern for me. It is hoped that this analysis of the issue of Ukraine‟s 
joining NATO will contribute to transcending of the traditional boundaries of thinking 
about international politics and Ukraine‟s post-Soviet transition in particular. 
This study is a product of two years of research in DePaul University and 
engagement in a social context that is very different from Ukraine where I started my 
scholarship. Having lived for the past seven years in the United States and having 
experienced a decentralization of identity, I have learned to observe how the various 
discourses which are embedded in cultural and social practices shape both our reality and 
identity. It is noteworthy that this thesis is a part of my ongoing analysis about 
governmentality and the ways power is exercised. In fact, questions of power relations 
have significantly influenced my view not only about Ukraine‟s membership in NATO, 
but also about the conception of modernity. While in Ukraine, the discourse of Western 
standards is powerful and modernization is defined only in terms of a post-communist 
transition, I maintain that Ukraine is still subjected to conditions that continue to place 
the country under Western capitalism's neo-colonial domination.  
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As will become apparent, in the absence of reference to any prominent 
postmodern theorist my challenge to such enlightenment ideas as progress and modernity 
is based on my reading of French philosophers, Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard. 
My thesis criticizes the view of Western modernization as progress and attempts to show 
that under the banner of democracy promotion, economic growth and consumerism 
powerful social forces impose the capitalist path of development and the Western-led 
model of social and cultural systems to secure their position of dominance and 
exploitation. In my work, I make clear that NATO should be examined in the context of 
the concept of governance that was formulated by Foucault, saying that global social 
forces are exercising their political authority at distance and whose aim is to establish and 
consolidate capitalist international order. Furthermore, my study of Ukraine‟s integration 
in NATO clearly suggests looking at the process of Ukraine‟s integration into Western 
institutions as a way to transform and discipline Ukrainian society according to the 
demands of neoliberal capitalism. Without neoliberal model of disciplined control of 
individuals, current kind of global capitalism is impossible.
50
 In this context, the role of 
democratic principles and procedures in various institutional structures is crucial.  
Overall, my research maintains that in the contemporary world of globalization, 
Ukrainian state has become subjected to the agents and structural forces of neoliberal 
capitalism. I seek to point out the fact that neoliberalism is a powerful ideology which 
weakens state sovereignty and works to further world order on the basis of norms and 
mechanisms of global governance. Once again, I have to emphasize that Foucault‟s 
vision of power and his ideas about discourse have been crucial for reevaluation of my 
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positions and beliefs.  Drawing on Foucault‟s concept of governmentality it has become 
clear that the Ukrainian state has no monopoly on sovereign power, and should be 
considered only as an instrument to exercise an authority and legitimize the use of force 
over its population. While performing services for national oligarchy, the Ukrainian state 
is being forced to operate in the interests of transnational corporations.
51
   
Although the theoretical basis of this research allows for multiple theoretical 
perspectives and appropriates a postmodernist position to take a significant place in this 
analysis, it should be clear that none of the theories mentioned above carry the task of 
changing the international system as it is today. Obviously, postmodernism, while 
arguing that our reality is discursively constructed, rejects the struggle to form a new 
alternative.  For this reason, through linking interest in overcoming economic inequalities 
and various forms of oppression, it is decided to adopt critical theory as the basic research 
methodology. Focusing on the relations of domination and considering Marx's concept of 
false consciousness and criticism of modernity as the initial stage of its development, 
critical theory in contrast to post-modernist approach anticipates in creation of new 
possibilities for social justice and progress.
52
 
B. Literature Review 
Introducing Wallerstein 
While the main framework of the research is based on critical theory, at first it is 
necessary to examine Immanuel Wallerstein‟s world-system theory. Despite the debates 
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of the origins of capitalist development
53
 and an ongoing critique, concerned with not 
giving enough weight to the cultural analysis, Wallerstein‟s world-system approach sheds 
a light on the fact that the course of international system is the course of capitalist 
economy.
54
 Wallerstein‟s criticism of modernization theory and his analyses of the 
hegemonic power lead not only to the reexamination of the role and position of Ukraine 
in the capitalist global world, but also the essence of historical change in general. Initially 
it is worth noting that according to Wallerstein, the analysis of any sovereign state such 
as Ukraine cannot be done separately from the world-system. Crucial to my argument is 
Wallerstein‟s idea that the accurate starting point of analysis should be the capitalist 
world-system, and sovereign states have to be seen as a part of organizational formation 
within single capitalist world-economy.
55
 From this perspective, economic and socio-
political changes in Ukraine along with particular events should be examined in the 
scheme of modern capitalist world-system. 
Wallerstein‟s method is very useful in understanding that economic base is the 
driving force and global capitalism is radically unfair economic, political and cultural 
order. Drawing heavily from orthodox Marxist analysis, Wallerstein observes that the 
essence of the capitalist world economy consists of unequal exchange relations between 
different geographical areas of the world and the parasitic relationship between 
developed and underdeveloped countries. While this point is specifically analyzed in 
chapter four, it is important to underline that, according to Wallerstein, the capitalist 
world-economy operates through the order of cyclical rhythms to which scholar refers as 
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to Kondratieff cycles. As Wallerstein summarizes, Kodratieff cycles consists of the phase 
A and the phase B which have so far been fifty or sixty years in length.
56
 Assuming that 
capitalism is a system whose dynamic is to spread out or collapse, it should be obvious 
that the phase A reflects the recovery and the expansion of the economy, while the phase 
B signifies its exhaustion and stagnation. Because significant structural changes are 
implemented in the phase B in order to return to the phase A, “a Kondratieff cycle, when 
it ends, never returns the situation to where it was at the beginning of the cycle.”
57
 
Following Wallerstein, it should be clear that a series of restoration measures, which have 
been repeatedly applied throughout the last 500 years to solve problems of capital 
accumulation, resulted in the transformation of the “capitalist world-economy from a 
system located primarily in Europe to one that covers the entire globe.”
58
 
In the current historical conjuncture, according to the world-system approach, the 
B-phase of the Kondratieff cycle (world-wide economic stagnation), which the capitalist 
world-economy experiences, comes to its end and marks the collapse of capitalism. 
Acknowledging that there are two scenarios for the future of capitalist world-economy 
and one of them is the possibility of the restructuring of the capitalist system and 
formation of new wave of cyclic changes, Wallerstein insists that capitalism will be 
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Wallerstein believes that capitalism has entered a critical phase, unfavorable for 
maximum accumulation of capital and thereby for a new transition into the phase A. 
Once again, this means that under this scenario, the current global system of modernity 
has reached a crisis point that will eventually lead to the establishment of a new historical 
system. This argument, in turn, is supported by Wallerstein‟s assertion that the decline of 
U.S. hegemony in the 1970s led to global capitalist crisis. Nevertheless, while 
Wallerstein‟s approach offers a cyclical view of history and deliberates on the concept of 
hegemony as the necessary structural element of capitalist socio-political and economic 
order, it seems that the world-system theorist underestimates the current role of the 
capitalist hegemonic state in the system of international relations, the United States. 
From Wallerstein‟s viewpoint, the hegemony of the United States has ended 
during the capitalist crisis in 1970s. In his work titled U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for 
Hegemony, Wallerstein argues that the period of unquestioned U.S. hegemony lasted 
during the first twenty-five years of the post World War II period.
60
  According to the 
author, the crucial turning point was the “world revolution” of 1968 which (depending on 
location) was seen as anti-liberal and anti-tyranny movements of the working class, the 
reaction to U.S. imperialism and a civil-right struggle. Wallerstein claims that in addition 
to the dissatisfaction with a pace of economic recovery and weakened socio-political 
values, the rise of economic rivals and the U.S. Vietnam‟s defeat, “all taken together, 
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mark the beginning of the decline of the United States.”
61
 To add extra weight to this 
idea, Wallerstein notes that it was at this point that the cost of good times with its 
consequences started to be experienced. Institutional foundations of post-war prosperity 
began if not to fall apart, then to shake noticeably.
62
  
Behind the Curtains: Structural Power 
Setting aside the structural economic changes in the world politics during the 
1970s, Susan Strange‟s examination of the notion of structural power in international 
relations has been a valuable theoretical contribution for this work. Strange suggests that 
we reject a classical realist view on the concept of power and hegemony, which 
emphasizes the category of the state as the central actor exercising power in the relational 
aspect or in terms of resources, and move on to think of power in terms of influence and 
ability to determine the way in which the relationship between states, political and 




While Strange agreed with Wallerstein that a sharp decline of the U.S. power has 
taken place, she disagrees that the United States has lost its hegemonic power over the 
system of international relations.
64
 According to Strange, the idea of America‟s declining 
power, and the notion that this decline has been a vital cause for the disorder of the 
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capitalist world-system is simply a myth.
65
 Strange is clear that the reason for the 
impression of the weakened U.S. authority is the fact that the capital controls have been 
dissolved and markets along with their actors have been given much more freedom to 
operate in the integrated world. In other words, Strange argues that the decline of U.S. 
hegemony can be explained by the government‟s unwillingness to intervene with global 
free market mechanisms as opposed to the perception of military or economic failures of 
the U.S. in the international arena.
66
 
For Strange, the change in America‟s role and position in the world has been 
determined by internal economic factors rather than international and political. As 
Strange points out, since 1970s in the U.S. foreign policy the goal of pursuing 
commercial and financial interests has finally overcome its political and national 
interests.
67
 This way of looking at things, according to Chris Brown, allows us to see the 
influence of America‟s corporate class over its foreign policy.
68
 It should be clear that 
while the strength of the American political system to influence the international agenda 
has been weakening, the ability of the U.S. corporate class to exercise power over the 
international community has been increasing.
69
 
This does not mean that the United States as a superpower has been in decline, 
rather, it has changed its role. As Strange notes, the intensified role of U.S. multinational 
companies worldwide signifies that the ability of the United States to exercise influence 
and authority has become much greater than that of any other government in the 
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 Strange argues that although at the height of reorganization of the 
international economic system in 1970s there were weaknesses in the American power 
and consequently the deterioration of international regimes, the expression of U.S. 




According to Strange, there are four primary structures upon which the 
international system is based and through which the hegemony maintains and operates.  
These primary, separate and independent, but at the same time interconnected structures 
are: the financial structure, the political structure, the production structure and the 
knowledge structure.
72
  Generally for Strange, all four are significant, and the state-actor 
which has primary control over the structures and consequently can gain favorable 




Neo-Gramscianism and Understandings of International Political Economy 
In contrast to the idea that the U.S. hegemony has declined dramatically, neo-
Gramscian approaches in international political economy, which developed in the 1980s, 
elaborate on the concept of structural power and argue that the U.S. hegemony did not 
end in the 1970s, but has increased significantly. Drawing from Antonio Gramsci‟s ideas 
of hegemony and transnational class alliances, neo-Gramscian theorists such as Robert 
Cox, Stephen Gill, and Adam David Morton analyze hegemony in ideological, cultural 
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and class context and apply the structural power frame to international relations. For 
example, Cox, in his work titled Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory, makes it clear that direct control and supremacy of one 
state over the chain of other states may be essential but not enough for the hegemony to 
be exercised.
74
 Cox pays much closer attention to the role of ideas and institutions in 
maintaining a stable international order and develops an analysis of the U.S. hegemony 
which, according to him, is an outcome of the alliance of capitalist class and social forces 
from all over the world. 
Clearly, although within the state, Wallerstein considers hegemony to be based on 
the combination of ideology, institutions and ideas which ensure the continuing 
supremacy of leading corporate classes, on an inter-state level, world-system approach 
limits itself to the state-centric conception and misses the restructuring of the global 
capitalism during the 1980s.
75
 Gill is among those who heavily criticizes the conventional 
notion of hegemony, associated with the behavioral forms of power, and elaborates on 
the idea that both domestic and international power spreads not only behaviorally, but 
also structurally, in “normative” and “material” proportions.
76
 As Gill argues, the power 
and influence of the United States continues, but nowadays it is through cultural values 
such as consumerism and individualism.
77
 It is important to recognize that this kind of 
American hegemony has been built and maintained through the “combination of tactical 
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alliances” which have operated though a great variety of institutions.
78
 Focusing on class 
analysis and Gramscian theory, Gill points out that the American corporate class invested 
enormous power resources into the formation of transnational capitalist alliances through 
which its power and hegemony are exercised on a global scale.
79
 
If we think about the nature of international system since 1970, it should be 
obvious that it is structured in a way that produces positive outcomes for the American 
corporate class notwithstanding state‟s economic or military position. The ability to set 
the global agenda through international organizations and transnational alliances has 
provided the United States a possibility to exercise its power with a minimal amount of 
force. As Cox underlines, the existence of formal and informal institutions allows 
pressure on states to be exercised without a visibility of state‟s power and authority 
usurpation.
80
 Neo-Gramscians point out that international institutions such as IMF, World 
Bank, WTO, NATO, and UN Security Council should be seen as instruments of U.S. 
hegemony. 
In this connection, Stefano Guzzini underlines that the concept of structural power 
involves “three different meanings, namely, indirect institutional power, nonintentional 
power, and impersonal empowering.”
81
 Although the activity of global socio-political, 
economic and military foundations looks like a consequence of an interaction of intended 
and inadvertent influence of actor‟s decisions and non-decisions, according to Guzzini, 
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Strange‟s structural lens make a compelling case for the “non-intentional power.”
82
 
Guzzini notes that for Strange, the international system seems to be administered by the 
transnational forces whose location is very difficult to identify for the reason of being not 
tied to a particular geographic territory, but whose current centre for decision making is 
in the United States.
83
 Following Strange, Guzzini concludes that regardless of the fact 
that forces in the U.S. are not always able to control what gets on the international agenda 
and what will be the outcome of their decisions or actions, the international structure is 
organized “in a way that decisions in countries are systematically tied to and affect actors 
in the same and other countries.”
84
 
As is apparent, forces exercising hegemony do not exist exclusively within states. 
Examining the issue from the perspective of critical theory, Cox argues that the “entire 
world can be seen as a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an 
intermediate though autonomous role between the global structure of  social forces and 
local configurations of social forces within the particular countries.”
85
 Therefore, it is 
extremely important not to take the notion of state and identity as unquestioned starting 
points and understand that both the nation-state and national identity have arisen under 
certain historical conditions. If we think about the state in terms of this discourse, the 
crucial point is that the behavior of actors in the system of international relations is 
“shaped either directly by pressures projected through the system or indirectly by the 
subjective awareness on the part of actors of the constraints imposed by the system.”
86
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In this context, William Robinson makes it clear that if prior to the late 1960s, 
state capitalist classes were in well-defined rivalry with each other, in the modern era of 
globalization we are witnessing the formation of a world ruling class “whose coordinates 
are no longer national.”
87
 Thus, it is important to note that “as national circuits of capital 
become transnationally integrated, these new transnational circuits become the sites of 
class formation worldwide.”
88
 Therefore, capitalist elites, in order to protect their 
privileged status act collectively through strengthening and extending international 
institutions, democracy and free-trade ideology.
89
 Those who do not obey the rules of the 
dominant capitalist elites and act in the interests of the state, people and communities are 
punished with strong sanctions, international isolation or military force. 
Strengthening of Ukraine’s Peripheral Structure  
Obviously, now we are witnessing the transformation of Ukraine into a full-
fledged market economy and finalization of the process of capitalist class formation. The 
power in Ukraine belongs to the wealthy echelons of society which are a part of a 
complex system working to extend and consolidate Western neoliberal hegemony. As 
Ukrainian elite is focused mainly on its personal enrichment, there are doubts about long-
term strategic planning in Ukrainian foreign and internal policies. Further, sovereignty of 
the Ukrainian state and power of the central government can no longer be considered 
absolutely in categories of state or national interest.
90
 Ukrainian state is becoming more 
and more internationalized what means that sovereign power of the state is shifting to 
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international institutions and regimes. Therefore, the adoption of key decisions on 
strategic development is impossible without active involvement of supranational global 
institutions such as UN, IMF, NATO, WTO, G-8, EU, NATO, OSCE and so forth.
91
 In 
this context, the current stage of relations between Ukraine and NATO means a 
reorganization of the national forms of governance. In fact, while cooperation between 
the Alliance and Ukraine in economic, military and political spheres should be seen in 
context of reproduction of hegemonic relationships, possible future membership in 
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III.   THE NEOREALIST ARGUMENT - UKRAINE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND 
NATO 
A.  Argument 
While military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is simultaneously the 
worst case and a perfectly credible scenario, deterioration in relations between the two 
former Soviet republics is inevitable in the case of Ukraine joining NATO without 
Russia. Even at the early stage of Ukrainian movement towards NATO, initiated by 
former president Yushchenko, Russia‟s negative reaction was apparent. This section of 
the thesis places the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO in the context of the 
concept of security from the “methodologically positivist and philosophically realist”
92
 
standpoint, and argues that Ukraine‟s admission to the military circle of the Western 
states not only harms European security in general, but expands the danger of war.  
As a part of my argumentation that Ukrainian membership in NATO is not in the 
interests of Ukraine, this chapter focuses on the main argument of the Ukrainian political 
establishment in favor of NATO. The chapter demonstrates that Ukraine‟s incorporation 
into the North Atlantic Alliance will decrease rather than increase Ukrainian security “by 
placing it in a more vulnerable position than it was before it chose to join the alliance.”
93 
Despite the rhetoric, there is a growing realization that the expansion of the military 
alliance into Russia‟s geopolitical backyard is extremely risky and may in fact reduce 
Ukraine‟s state security. Even during Yushchenko‟s presidency, in a moment when 
Ukraine was actively pursuing membership in NATO, Russia had every reason to view 
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this as a threat especially when taking into consideration the factor of the United States in 
the region. The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, in his speech before the lower 
house of Parliament in 2006 said that NATO‟s relations with Ukraine are examined from 
the point of view of the Russia‟s national interest and the acceptance of Ukraine will 
mean a “colossal geopolitical shift.”
94
 Since the Orange Revolution, while the U.S. has 
been pressing Ukraine toward NATO membership, Russia has been expressing its 
dissatisfaction with political leaders‟ ambitions of Ukraine by cutting energy supplies and 
intervening in Ukraine‟s domestic politics. Therefore, I argue that NATO membership for 
Ukraine will lead to negative consequences for relations between Ukraine and Russia 
which may result in an unfavorable outcome for Ukrainian society.  
Although there is an impression in the West that the question of war in Europe 
has been solved, a nuclear-armed Russia has every reason to view NATO expansion as a 
direct threat to its state security which in its turn may lead to the taking of protective 
measures on the part of the Russian leadership. The status of the Black Sea Fleet in 
Crimea, and considerable Russian-speaking communities in Ukraine, and its economic 
dependence on Russian energy resources raise significant concerns about the 
unpredictable consequences of Ukraine‟s entry into NATO. The chapter analyzes how 
Ukraine can suffer more under NATO and ultimately questions the very credibility of 
NATO‟s security commitment to Ukraine in the case of military confrontation.   
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B. The Illusionary Fear of Russia 
The Neorealist Logic  
By claiming that NATO membership for Ukraine will maximize the security of 
the country, it is clear that the pro-Western government has used neorealist terminology 
to formulate its main argument for Ukraine to join NATO.
95
 This evidence is supported 
by the neorealist assumption that sovereign states are the only actors in the system of 
international relations which are motivated by state interest and driven by power.
96
 
According to neorealism, the interest of each state is its security and survival. 
Furthermore, in Kenneth N. Waltz‟s words, “Preoccupation with identifying dangers and 
counteracting them become a way of life.”
97
 This means that states are obliged to 
“continually adjust their stance in the world in accordance with their reading of power of 
others and their own power.”
98
 Michael Altfeld argues that the security of a state can be 
strengthened either by building up its own military or by joining an alliance formed on 
the basis of mutual commitments by states to oppose dangers jointly in case of one being 
attacked.
99
 While the enlargement of the military is financially costly and demands a 
considerable expenditure of human resources, membership in an alliance, according to 
James Morrow, increases security immediately “with the costs of commitment to the ally, 
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Stephen M. Walt‟s widely cited book The Origins of Alliances concentrates on the 
elaboration and testing of a number of hypotheses about alliance formation and 
functioning.
 
Walt claims that the behavior of states is determined by threats, and argues 
that the process of forming or joining the alliances occurs in the pursuit of security or 
autonomy. For Walt, external threats are the primary and the most unquestionable 
catalyst to becoming a member of the military alliance.
101
 Being focused on external 
threats, the state faces a choice between joining a system of collective security or allying 
itself with the source of danger and domination. Walt argues that consideration of such 
factors as aggregate and offensive power, geographic proximity and certain conditions in 
regional or international politics with its ideological and intentional implications play a 
crucial role in the state‟s adjusting of its security policy. According to Walt‟s theory, the 
conscious choice to pursue membership in NATO and the abandonment of a non-aligned 
multi-vector foreign policy is a natural reaction of Ukraine to the perception of the threat 
from the Russian Federation and can be explained by a “balance of threat theory.”
102
 On 
the basis of a “balance of threat theory”, Walt instructs Ukraine to join NATO rather than 
keeping its neutral stand or bandwagoning with Russia.  
The tense state of relations between Ukraine and Russia has represented the cost 
of Ukraine‟s neutrality as extremely high. Being confronted by significant pressure from 
Russia, the choice of neutrality for Ukraine seemed to place the survival of the state at 
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huge, visible risk. For Walt, the geographical propinquity of threat is a key factor in the 
process of alliances‟ grouping which for its part shapes the perception of Ukraine‟s 
political elite and determines the choice of alliance partners. Walt is clear that alignment 
with a threatening state is perilous as it only multiplies the resource base of the dominant 
actor and strengthens the relations between strong and weak states on the basis of 
obedience.
103
 While perceiving the coalition with others to balance against the threat 
from the state nearby, the pro-NATO forces have been confident that the power and 
ambitions of Russia will be reduced and thereby NATO membership would enhance 
Ukraine‟s regional influence. In reality, Yushchenko‟s NATO ambitions in the face of 
solid popular opposition not only put emphasis on the underdeveloped sense of Ukrainian 
state interest but also led to the deterioration of its relations with Russia. 
The Justification for NATO Membership 
While tensions in bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia existed before 
Yushchenko became the president, during his five years‟ tenure Russian-Ukrainian 
relations worsened significantly. Yushchenko‟s inability to consolidate power and his 
failure to implement coherent domestic economic reforms resulted in an intensified 
foreign policy approach based on security and geopolitical considerations rather than 
economic benefits. Furthermore, identity politics in the form of Ukrainian nationalism 
which was stoked under Yushchenko and which was drawn upon to compensate the 
failure of the state, has become the main instrument in the hands of political leadership to 
“shape both the internal political landscape and the whole set of goals and instruments of 
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 As the country was pushed deeper and deeper from serious political 
crisis into economic decline, the rhetoric of internal security and geopolitics, laden with 
identity politics, was intensified. In this context, Mikhail Molchanov, while analyzing 
Ukraine‟s policy of European integration, points out that the main objectives and overall 
direction of Ukraine‟s foreign policy has always been used by Ukrainian leadership “to 
compensate for glaring failures of domestic policy on practically every direction 
imaginable.”
105
 The struggle for power during the entire Yushchenko‟s presidential term 
and a serious economic crisis with institutionalized corruption, heavy unemployment and 
unprecedented fall in living standards facilitated the growth of anti- Russianism “as the 
best proof of democratic credentials and western orientation of newly independent 
state.”
106
 Therefore, on the basis of Molchanov‟s analysis, the point is that Russia has 
never been a threat for Ukraine and the sources of Ukraine‟s problems are within 
Ukraine‟s elected leadership.
107
 Nevertheless, focusing on government alone is not 
enough. The problem is much deeper and involves the issues in spheres of manipulation 
of public consciousness.  
Molchanov refers to anti-Russianism not only as a justification of Ukrainian 
independence that was developed by Western opinion leaders throughout the first post-
Soviet decade, but argues that the perception of Russia as an enemy and the rhetorical 
reaffirmation of the myth of resurgence of Russian imperialism has been instrumental in 
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the country‟s developing of  pro-NATO drive. This is to confirm Richard Solomon‟s 
assumption made in 1999 that “Ukraine‟s acceptance of a Western policy of actively 
pulling Ukraine into NATO would surely sharpen the appearance of an anti-Russian 
ideology on the part of the Ukrainian government, thereby severely threatening relations 
not only between Russia and Ukraine, but also between Russians and Ukrainians.”
108
 The 
perception of Ukraine as a victim of a hostile Russian foreign policy has been constructed 
to alienate Ukraine from Russia as much as possible both in geopolitical and cultural 
contexts.
109
  Thus, while realizing the complexity and sensitivity of the issue of eastward 
NATO expansion on Russia's borders, Yushchenko, with strong support of Washington, 
was pushing Ukraine into NATO at the expense of its relationship with Moscow.  
It should be apparent that Yushchenko‟s approach to bringing Ukraine into 
NATO was based on the strategy of raising the level of hatred towards Russia and 
represented itself as a justification for Ukrainian membership in the military organization. 
Yushchenko was confident that only the perception of Russia as an enemy or a threat for 
Ukraine could change the view of NATO within the Ukrainian population and could 
bring the case for NATO membership for Ukraine without Russia. The rhetoric and 
activity of the former president was directed to reproduce Ukrainian hostility towards 
Russia through propaganda that accuses the Russian people for the crimes not just of 
monarchial Russia but even for all those of the Soviet leadership against Ukrainian 
people.
110
 In fact, the debate around ethnic differences between Russians and Ukrainians, 
                                                          
108
 Richard H. Solomon, Foreword to Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, by Anatol Lieven (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), x. 
109
 Molchanov, “Ukraine’s European Choice: Pitfalls and Prospects,” 7. 
110
 Adopted from Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, 157. 
49 
 
enthusiastically supported by Yushenko‟s government, in turn significantly contributed to 
the challenges related to Ukraine‟s state building.  
Unfortunately, in spite of the people‟s great optimism and expectations, 
Yushchenko was not only unsuccessful in developing pragmatic and balanced domestic 
and foreign policies, but significantly contributed to putting Ukraine on the verge of a 
split with the western part of the country shifting towards the West and the eastern and 
central parts moving towards Russia. Constant speculations about Ukrainian history, 
issues of maritime border demarcation and the status of Russia‟s navy in the Crimean 
Peninsula, gas disputes, mutual political accusations and aggressive rhetoric by Kiev and 
Moscow significantly contributed to the situation which has been found as threatening 
and hostile for both Ukraine and Russia. While Russia was making demonstrative and 
more conflict-oriented actions to show Ukraine‟s vulnerability to ethnic and linguistic 
pressures, Yushchenko‟s push towards Ukraine‟s integration into NATO was grounded 
on the view of Russia being a rogue, egoistic and threatening state. The strategic choice 
between East and West which has attracted its attention during the events of Orange 
Revolution, and Yushenko‟s appeal to Ukrainian nationalism explain the escalation of the 
hostile perception of Russia among Ukrainians.  
To be sure, under Yushchenko‟s leadership, the Ukrainian perception of Russia as 
a threat was intensified and served as a serious destabilizing factor for Ukrainian society. 
In this regard, George Liska confirms the idea that a possibility for conflict is the decisive 
factor in the alignment and realignment policies of each state.
111
 As Liska claims, the 
primary advantage of the movement toward alignment is deterrence and confrontation of 
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rival or adversary. Through the conclusion of agreements in the realm of national security 
the stronger state or the partner-states commit to mutual assistance of the potential victim 
in the case of possible conflict with another strong power. While the goals which every 
state expects to achieve by means of alliance are various, according to Liska, the threat 
against the weaker state from the third party is a determining condition in alignment and 
realignment processes. Similarly, Glen Snyder stresses that “adversary relations provide 
the reason d‟état for alliances and alignments.”
112
 Therefore, concerns about maximizing 
the self-preservation of Ukraine and the necessity to align against Russia served as a 
specific motivation for the speediest decision to pursue membership in NATO, what in its 
turn was represented as a right choice to serve Ukrainian state interests.  
C. Russia’s Security Dilemma 
If for the Soviet leadership, the signing on 4 April 1949 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty was interpreted as an offensive move by the Western bloc, allowing Ukraine to 
join NATO without Russia would signify an immediate geostrategic threat and danger for 
Moscow. This fact is supported by the neorealist premise which finds the reason for such 
a sense of insecurity in the anarchical nature of the international system.
113
 Historically, 
during the formation of NATO, there was a strong common interest to provide a defense 
against the Soviet bloc. At the same time, Soviet Union had to take actions to protect 
itself. The Soviet response to the formation of the military Alliance was to enhance its 
own power and security by the counter-formation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance as 
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well as the founding of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.
114
 From the position of the neorealist 
theory of international relations, the behavior of the Soviet Union was caused by the fear 
of insecurity generated by the uncertainty about the intentions of the United States.
115
 In 
its turn, the formation of a counter-alliance provided reasons for NATO members to 
consider the behavior of the Soviet Union as aggressive. Since no side could recognize 
that the buildup of the military power was defensively inspired, each had to presuppose 
that it could be planned for attack.
116
 Such an illusionary perception of security, based on 
the uncertainty about others‟ intentions, has served to be the explanation for the Cold 
War and the successful existence of the North-Atlantic military alliance since 1949.  
The Russian Fear of Geo-Strategic Threat  
The Russian perception of the Atlantic Alliance and its enlargement elicits an 
antagonistic reaction from Moscow and is an important factor in Ukraine‟s desire to join 
NATO. In the minds of the Russian political elite as well as the average Russian, the 
prospect of a new wave of NATO expansion to include Ukraine indicates a “continuation 
of the policy aimed at pushing Russia out of its traditional spheres of influence, and a 
move that signifies Russia‟s encirclement with international protectorates or mandate 
territories of a Bosnia-Kosovo type.”
117
 For Russia, on the basis of the historical 
assumptions, the process of NATO‟s eastward enlargement seems to be motivated by the 
Western intentions to exploit Russia‟s weakness and should not be viewed as a peaceful 
process. In fact, a strong opposition to the idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO and 
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the Alliance‟s continuous expansion all the way to Russia‟s borders is a clear sign of 
NATO‟s dismissal of Russian interests, and therefore evokes a harsh reaction from the 
Russian political establishment. If the inclusion of three Baltic countries heightened 
Russia‟s sense of isolation, the Ukrainian accession to NATO, according to the average 
Russian, would be decisive evidence of Western attempts to isolate and subordinate 
Russians at the same time.
118
 The point is that while Western World perhaps views 
NATO as being transformed into a political organization, in Russia, the Alliance is 
considered in purely military terms. From the Russian perspective, plans to incorporate 
Ukraine into the Western military alliance along with the American proposal to deploy 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) components in Eastern Europe are grounded on realist 
reasoning and are targeted against Russia, regardless of whether there is an authoritarian 
or democratic form of government. Western behavior has been interpreted as aggressive, 
and an extension of NATO‟s influence as a threat to Russia‟s security. 
Within Russian society it is generally accepted that the process of NATO 
enlargement is connected to Western perceptions of Russia as being a potential enemy.
119
 
Such an assumption is based on anti-Russian opinions, prevalent mostly in the United 
States and Eastern Europe, which are rooted in the past dating back hundreds of years, 
and which since the end of the Cold War have continued to be full of hostility.
120
 The 
growth of Russia‟s defense spending, its attempts to preserve its traditional sphere of 
influence and its elimination of domestic opposition have contributed to an image of 
                                                          
118
 Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, 156. 
See also Kent R. Meyer, “US Support for Baltic Membership in NATO: What Ends, What Risks?” 
Parameters 30 (Winter 2000-2001), 67-82.  
119
 Anatol Lieven, “The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution,” in NATO Enlargement: Illusions and 
Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001), 147. 
120
 Ibid., 145. 
53 
 
Russia as a potential threat. This view of Russia as a source of danger was recently 
reinforced by the depiction of war in Georgia by the Western mass-media. While 
rejecting Georgia‟s role in starting the conflict along with ignoring the importance of the 
U.S. material support to Saakashvili's regime, Western journalists, according to historian 
Herbert Bix, “Fostered Russophobic sentiment by disseminating completely one-sided 
war news, demonizing Russia as the evil aggressor, and championing „democratic‟, 
peace-loving Georgia.”
121
 While realizing that it is not possible to completely grasp the 
objectivity and being willing to adjust myself to the relativity of truth claims, I tend to 
agree with this viewpoint. Moreover, this debate clearly demonstrates how power 
relations contribute to the formation of certain knowledge and leads to conclude that 
perceptions play a critical role in the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO. 
As seen from Moscow, a new round of hostility towards Russia clearly confirms 
that the West‟s struggle against communism and the Soviet Union had not ideological, 
but exclusively geopolitical meaning. This viewpoint finds its support in different schools 
of thought regarding the strategic geopolitical importance of the area of the former Soviet 
bloc precisely to the United States.  Nevertheless, to provide a clear and a strong 
explanation for NATO‟s engagement with the countries of the former Soviet Union, it is 
necessary to refer to the geopolitical views of one of the prominent advocates of NATO‟s 
membership for Ukraine which is motivated by the resentment toward Russia. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, former national security advisor in the Carter administration, has portrayed 
Russia‟s exercise of its influence on neighboring states as a extension of uncivilized and 
“proto-imperial approach”, and has argued for the adoption of the Western policy of 
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“geopolitical pluralism” that should seek as its primary objective to guarantee that Russia 
would not become a “mighty supranational state and a truly global power.”
122
 According 
to Brzezinski, the political, military and economic integration of the newly independent 




 Furthermore, in terms of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Brzezinski confirms this 
mode of thinking by arguing that “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but 
with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an 
empire.”
124
 Therefore, as it can be seen from this realist analysis of the role and place of 
once-Soviet states in Europe, it is clear that NATO‟s engagement with Ukraine is a part 
of a broader policy directed to oppose Russian interests in the region. Unfortunately, 
being great supporters of Ukraine‟s NATO membership, the majority of Western thinkers 
and policymakers such as Brzezinski simply ignores both the real interests of ordinary 
Ukrainians and their everyday reality and has been consciously pushing Ukraine into a 
culturally driven conflict with Russia.
125
  
The Problem of Self-Identification  
Ironically, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Ukraine and Russia have 
found themselves to be confronted with severe problems of self-identification and 
statecraft. In this context, Igor Klyamkin, Alexander Akhiezer and Igor Yakovenko have 
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argued that Russia‟s political crisis with the West during the Ukraine‟s presidential 
elections in 2004 was a conflict based on cultural principles.
126
 According to the scholars, 
the obvious explanation to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine is the fact that not only the 
Ukrainian political elite but also a considerable part of Ukrainian society have acquired 
the European identity and are on their way to the full integration into Western 
civilization.
127
 It should be pointed out that for Russia, allowing Ukraine to join Western 
institutions without Russia means an indication of imminent danger to Russian national 
identity which is grounded on the common history of the East Slavic peoples. Therefore, 
while this chapter argues against Ukrainian membership in NATO from the 
realist/neorealist perspective, it is also important to recognize subjective and behavioral 
obstacles to this membership that are closely related to the issues of national identity.  
It is a little wonder that with a Russian perception of the Atlantic Alliance and 
with the level of mutual interdependence between two states, Russia has been 
antagonized by the intentions of pro-Western leadership to alienate Ukraine from Russia 
culturally, as well as geopolitically. Linked to these, Klyamkin, Akhiezer and Yakovenko 
underline that “When Western civilization begins to expand by absorbing parts of the 
former Soviet empire, the logic of civilization is replaced by the logic of geopolitics.”
128
 
The authors suggest an idea that Ukraine‟s membership in NATO would signify the 
moment of Slavic civilization‟s loss of its basis, and thereby would advance the Russia‟s 
identity crisis to its depth. In fact, it should be plain that Russia‟s identity crisis involves 
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the issue of devaluation of Russia‟s long-standing identity as a strong Eurasian power in 
which the concern for Slavic-Orthodox unity dominates.  
While realizing that classification scheme to which we can also address Eastern 
Slavs is a modern construct and which is very problematic to apply in the academic work, 
it is also very important to understand that “all nations tell a version of their histories that 
is shaped by present circumstances.”
129
 Nevertheless, of all countries of the former Soviet 
Union Ukraine has the strongest cultural ties to Russia and is the most important partner 
country, but both nations are also intimately linked. Consequently, as Molchanov notes, 
considering the traditional Russian perception of Ukraine as a younger brother, if not 
actually a part of a large Russian ethnicity, the vision of inviolable border between the 
two states means much more than a conventional military dispute.
130
  
As a response to the crisis of Russia‟s dislocation of cultural bonds after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, a discourse of reunification and preservation of East- 
Slavic civilization of which Ukraine is an important part, and the idea of the domination 
of Russia in the Eurasian world  has represented an attempt to solve the national question 
for Russians. The fact that a great number of Russians live in neighboring states has 
become a crucial factor in the debate on who should belong to the Russian nation or 
whether Russia can sustain its image of the “unique” country, or even a separate 
civilization. According to a great number of Russian scholars and politicians, the 
development of Russian identity not only requires the unification of all Russians under 
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one political structure but also demands a multi-ethnic approach which involves the 
unification of all Eastern Slavs into one federal unit.   
Proponents of preserving the East Slavic civilization insist on the restoration of 
“the ties of organic solidarity between people, which are increasingly lost with the 
advance of Western civilization.”
131
As Vera Tolz says “linguistic and cultural similarities 
between Eastern Slavs and alleged common history, stretching back to the medieval 
principality of Kievan Rus” are the key elements that form the positive attitude of the 
majority of Russians to the view that Belarusians and Ukrainians are a part of the Russian 
nation.
132
 Moreover, it is important to underline that the majority of average Russians 
very often see themselves as “Soviet people” and regard the former Soviet space as their 
homeland. Thus, the idea of “all-Russian unity” which in turn demands an alteration of 
post-Soviet borders and limiting the sovereignty of Russia‟s independent post-Soviet 
neighbors “reveals a supranational, civilizational tendency” in the resolving of Russia‟s 
crisis of national identity.
133
  
Igor Zevelev stresses the dramatic growth of the formulations of the ideological 
factors of the Russian foreign policy in the  context of “civilizational affiliation of the 
country”, noting that “beginning in 2008, for the first time since the Soviet Union‟s 
breakup, the Russian government began to speak in terms of a large supranational 
project.”
134
 Nevertheless, while Zevelev acknowledges that identity is shaped by 
discursive practices and points out that supranational project in any form is a product of a 
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ruling class, he argues that current Russian domestic and foreign policy formulations in 
terms of civilizational affiliation resulted from “the failure of attempts to become an 




The key point we derive from the constructivist analysis of Ukraine‟s and 
Russia‟s identity problem is the “honest assessment of the Ukrainians‟ and Russians‟ 
common past.”
136
 Although a great number of contemporary Ukrainian, Russian and 
Western historians are involved in a struggle for an explanation of the origin of the Slavs, 
it is necessary to realize that Kievan Rus as a long-lasting East Slavic political entity 
existed before the modern Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian nations developed. 
Ukraine‟s and Russia‟s historical and political identification are interconnected, “their 
languages are traceable to a common root, their ethnic features exhibit profound 
similarities, and their mutual perceptions on a mass level are generally not hostile.”
137
 As 
Anatol Lieven comments, “These links have not just been forged over the centuries by 
Russian, then Soviet, governments but have also developed „organically‟ through 
millions of human contacts over hundreds of years.”
138
  
If the links between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples are to be disappeared, it 
should be allowed to occur through a slow and natural process of erosion, “without 
diktats, and without the stirring up of new ethnic hatred where none has so far existed.”
139
 
In this context, Molchanov indicates that “because of Ukraine‟s intimate connection to 
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Russian politics and society and Ukraine‟s crucial proximity to the very sense of Russian 
national identity,” Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO will represent the greatest 
challenge to Russia‟s long-term statehood and eventually may bring the country to 
catastrophe.
140
  In other words, with the deprivation of its Ukrainian essence, Russia will 




Ultimately, the policy of NATO enlargement is perceived by the Russians as anti-
Russian, and admittance of Ukraine into the alliance is considered as a course of action 
aimed to increase a distance between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, while the 
contemporary situation in Ukraine with two centers of gravity represents a danger for 
Russia, the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO unilaterally causes feelings of horror not 
only among fanatical nationalists but also among people of liberal-democratic 
convictions.
142
 Considering that the expansion of NATO is producing new dividing lines 
on the map of Europe as well as paying attention to anti-Russian attitude expressed in 
Western World and produced by those like Brzezinski, there is a complete justification 
for Russia of being suspicious or even afraid of the West.
143
 
D. From Risk to Immediate Danger 
With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, NATO was deprived of a reason for 
its existence as a military unit, and this created a problem for the realist/neorealist 
explanations of NATO expansion. However, while it is true that NATO has faced no 
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immediate threat, neorealists argue that the existence and enlargement of Alliance is 
directed to meet a potential threat from a resurgent Russia. From a neorealist point of 
view, the very exclusion of Russia and the growth of anti-Russian opinions in Eastern 
Europe is clear evidence that Russia continues to be a potential threat to NATO. While 
Russia has taken reciprocal steps to restore its defense capabilities, in the West this has 
been immediately interpreted as a revival of a military threat. Furthermore, Russian 




Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder develop a theoretical argument 
concerning the alignment to balance against the greatest perceived threat.
145
 Christensen 
and Snyder disagree with Walt‟s assertion that states should join in an alliance against the 
perceived threat and argue that successful pursuing of security in the multipolar world 
demands avoiding of alliances. This view holds that the increase of defense through 
forming the alliance in order to balance a threat decreases the security of the threatening 
state, and thereby gives a rise to the security dilemma which in turn provokes 
competitiveness and warfare. According to Christensen and Snyder, the multi-polar 
structure of the international system by itself is very dangerous and any active behavior 
of a state actor aimed at pursuing their interests may threaten the stability of the system 
and inevitably lead to nationalistic clashes with other states.
146
  
                                                          
144
 Ibid., 145. 
145
 Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in 
Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990). 
146
 Ibid., 140.  
61 
 
Despite the questionable status of the real motives of NATO enlargement, with 
the approach of powerful NATO military force to the Russian borders, the possibility of 
surprise attack on Russia from the West increases dramatically. In light of Russia‟s 
perception of NATO and the strategic importance of Ukraine for Russia, in the event of 
Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO, Russia will take short countermeasures. Because 
Russia will never reconcile itself to the humiliation and infringement of its state interests, 
further expansion of NATO without Russia would not only harm Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, but may threaten the entire structure of European security.
147
 The entry of 
Ukraine into NATO raises the possibility that in case of military confrontation between 
Russia and any other member of the alliance, the territory of Ukraine may become the 
main scene of military confrontation 
I tend to agree with the viewpoint that NATO‟s membership for Ukraine, while 
excluding Russia, “increases the most important potential threat to Ukraine, which is an 
internal one.”
148
 It is reasonable to expect that Ukraine‟s admittance into NATO would 
lead to resource depletion what in its turn could have the greatest impact on the economic 
and cultural destiny of the country. Moreover, being culturally divided with the eastern 
and central regions bearing a stronger Russian influence and the western regions pursuing 
a strong Western direction, turning Ukraine into a Western military ally would rise 
nationalist sentiments what would further divide Ukrainian society. Even the preliminary 
position and reaction of Russian government on the issue of Ukraine‟s joining NATO has 
contributed to a split of culturally and ideologically divided Ukraine. Under such 
circumstances, an open conflict between pro-Western and pro-Eastern Ukraine is likely. 
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In this case, there are no doubts that Russia would stand on its interests and would not 
leave its Russian Diaspora without support.
149
 Furthermore, according to Lieven, such a 
scenario would provide an opportunity for annexation of Crimean Peninsula and Eastern 
Ukraine to the Russian state.  
This assumption can be supported by the view of Samuel Huntington that culture 
will be central to any future conflict.
150
 If the wars of the previous centuries were 
“primary conflicts within Western civilization,” with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
interactions between Western and non-Western civilizations will determine the evolution 
of conflict.
151
 For Huntington, while the division of Europe on the basis of ideology has 
vanished, the cultural separation between “Western Christianity, on the one hand, and 
Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other hand, has reemerged.”
152
 Ukraine is 
situated on the dividing line in Europe and is culturally divided between the Catholic and 
Orthodox worlds.
153
 While pointing to the events in Yugoslavia, Huntington argues that 
cultural dividing line is a line of instability and bloody conflict. As Jennifer Moroney 
affirms, “being therefore unable to play that central role in the stability and security of 
Central Eurasia that is so often ascribed to it,” Ukraine cannot fully integrate into the 
West.
154
 Furthermore, according to Huntington‟s analysis, it is clear that any pro-Western 
move by the country that is closer to the opposite culture is extremely risky for its 
security. In short, Huntington‟s civilizational paradigm provides an intelligible 
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framework for understanding that “harmony between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine 
is the cornerstone of stability not just of Ukraine but of the entire region.”
155
 Huntington 
makes a crucial point for this research by noting that while a realist approach to the 
situation between Ukraine and Russia “highlights the possibility of a Russian-Ukrainian 
war, a civilizational approach minimizes that and instead highlights the possibility of 
Ukraine splitting in half.”
156
 
Realizing the reality of the situation, it is hard to have confidence in the 
determination of NATO to intervene on Ukraine‟s behalf in the case of war.
157
 It is not 
obvious how defense guarantees to Ukraine can be honored in the event of a 
confrontation with a nuclear Russia.
158
 Moreover, in the event of a military conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine which can begin over the matter of Russian Black Sea Fleet, 
situated in a Crimean city of Sevastopol which has a majority of ethnic Russians, any 
credible defense of Ukraine would demand a deployment of the ground military forces.
159
 
It is not in Germany, Italy‟s or even America‟s interests to defend a state that only a few 
years ago was considered to be on the opposite side of an ideological and geographical 
divide. As Christensen and Snyder notes, there is no guarantee that any of the member 
states can be protected until the other members of the alliance assume all the calculated 
risks.
160
 Allies have and maintain various ideas of their interests and the question of how 
much a state behaving in its state interest will contribute to security guarantees of other 
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states is not clear.
161
 Morrow underlines that “A decision to intervene in a crisis will be 
determined in part by specific interests of the state in the issues of that crisis.”
162
 There 
are too many differences among the interests of NATO members and too many nuances 
in the Ukraine-NATO-Russia triangle which also raises doubts in the ability of the U.S. 
to honor its commitment to NATO members. The negative attitude of Western Europe 
towards Ukraine‟s initiative to become a full-pledged member of Euro-Atlantic security 
arrangement throws doubts on the credibility of NATO and implies a supposition that 
NATO‟s expansion is meant to transit the cost of fighting Russia to Ukraine. Hyland 
suggests an idea that in “the face of current and prospective military realities, a NATO 
military guarantee will become a frivolous gesture.”
163
 Thus, Ukraine can become a base 
coin in the geopolitical game of great power politics.  
E. Conclusion 
Similar to the process of alliance formation during the period of Cold War, in the 
event of NATO enlargement, the perception of security threat has served as one of the 
legitimizing foundations for new and potential members to be incorporated into the 
military alliance. In the case of Ukraine, the active drive towards NATO membership 
gave the rise to anti-Russian ideology, and thereby significantly threatened relations not 
only between Russia and Ukraine, but also led to the internal instability in Ukraine. It is 
important to note that prior to Yushchenko‟s pushing Ukraine into NATO, relations 
between Ukraine and Russia had generally been stable. Despite the rhetoric of Ukrainian 
and Russian politicians, the level and quality of Russian-Ukrainian relations indicated 
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that Ukraine could not be threatened with Russian subjugation or conquest. Although 
NATO has been transformed in responsibilities and tasks since the early 1990s, 
Yushchenko‟s active pulling of Ukraine into NATO on Washington‟s urgings was clearly 
grounded on security concerns and was motivated by fear of the enemy. In arguing in 
neorealist terms, the question of Ukraine‟s joining NATO became crucial to the subject 
of Ukrainian independence and state sovereignty. In fact, it should be apparent that in the 
absence of a threat, NATO enlargement and Ukraine‟s incorporation in the Alliance 
while excluding Russia could never occur.  
From the recent rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia under the leadership 
of Yanukovych, it is clear how the interests of the policymakers influence and shape any 
particular course of actions. The decisive defeat of Yushchenko in Ukraine‟s 2010 
presidential elections and the disappearance of hostility toward Russia are one of the 
numerous indicators that the behavior of Yushchenko‟s government was not driven by 
the interests of the Ukrainian population. The impression seems to be that under the 
Orange leadership, Ukraine‟s state interest and its policy toward NATO membership was 
defined by the U.S. policy of “geopolitical pluralism” which was designed to expand U.S. 
influence to the borders of Russia. Not only was the Ukrainian state interest under 
Yushchenko subjectively driven, but the entire issue of Ukraine‟s security was defined 
through a discourse of Russia as an existential threat. In this context, it is clear that the 
social constructivist approach of international relations is extremely useful to examine the 
issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO.  
At the same time, I do not make any claim that under the current leadership of 
Yanukovych, the government has a positive role in advancing the interests of Ukrainian 
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people. The point is that since Ukraine gained its independence there has been no 
consensus about the Ukrainian state interest and its foreign policy approach. Being 
divided on the issue of Ukraine‟s foreign policy orientation, Ukrainian ruling elite has 
always put its own private economic interests ahead of the Ukraine‟s state interest.  
Ultimately, it should be clear from this chapter that the hypocritical myth of Russian 
drive for imperialism and aggression was created by the West through the reinterpretation 
of history, and which has been successfully adopted by the pro-Western ruling elite as a 
conceivable reason for the full integration into the Western institutions. 
 More important, matters of identity, community, and culture demonstrate an 
important point in the analysis of Ukraine‟s foreign policy and indicate that the potential 
threat to Ukraine comes from within in the form of ethnic nationalism which gains 
strength from Western desire to impose on Ukraine the U.S. led international order. 
Admittedly, any effort to incorporate Ukraine into NATO would result in a new wave of 
anti-Russian nationalism which in turn “could produce exactly what the West should fear 
most, a reaction in Russia and the Russian diaspora.”
164
 As a result, this would fuel the 
growth of Russian ethnic nationalism which would obviously have an effect on Russian 
foreign policy, and thus make war between these two neighbors and the split of Ukraine 
very likely.
165
 The most straightforward explanation for this is the conviction of a great 
number of Russians that Ukraine is at very heart of the Russian state-building problem. 
While arguing that the Russian Orthodox Church was born in Kiev and drawing on the 
history of Kievan Rus, Molchanov makes it clear that in some respects Ukraine is more 
                                                          
164
 Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, 158. 
165
 Ibid., 158-159. 
67 
 
“Russian” than Russia itself.
166
 There are no doubts that for Russian nationalists, the case 
of Ukraine‟s choosing the “wrong side of what many see as a global divide separating the 
Russia-led world of Orthodoxy and the consumerist, individualist, and exploitative 
West,”
 
would signify the kiss of death.
167
 Consequently, Russia would be forced to take 
defensive measures in strategic terms.  
The expansion of NATO and incorporation of Ukraine into the Alliance is “an 
unnecessary, expensive, and provocative initiative with perilous implications.”
168
 If for 
Russia, Ukraine‟s induction into NATO would signify more than just crossing the “red 
line” of what Russia considers its sphere of influence, for Ukraine it would mean only an 
illusion of security. In addition, Ukraine‟s economic dependence on Russia contributes 
greatly to the idea that Ukraine cannot pursue NATO membership at the expense of 
Ukrainian-Russian relations. Indeed, as discussed in this chapter, Russia‟s perception of 
Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO is a key factor which is critical to Russian-Ukrainian 
relations and to Europe‟s stability overall.  
 The incorporation of a country with a large Russian population and huge cultural 
differences would be destabilizing and is unlikely to make the continent of Europe more 
stable. It is quite clear that with Ukraine‟s admission into the military alliance, the 
potential for military confrontation with Russia increases. In its turn, the likely war 
between Russia and Ukraine may spill into the number of conflicts between European 
NATO member states and Russia, and this thereby would increase the danger of a 
Russian-American confrontation. Certainly, that would cause not only a European crisis, 
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but would lead to a disastrous outcome. However, in a hypothetical case of military 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, NATO allies can refrain from participation on the 
side of Ukraine. According to the majority of military experts, the U.S. involvement 
along with the European allies in hostilities against Russia, with its powerful nuclear 
arsenal, looks quite doubtful. NATO members can make pledges to defend Ukraine under 
Article V of the NATO Treaty, but in times of crisis there is no guarantee they will keep 
their promises, and thus NATO membership for Ukraine may result only in a paper 
security guarantee.
169
 The point is that the key benefit of Ukraine‟s membership in 
NATO, which is the collective defense guarantees, is uncertain.
170
  
This chapter has focused on the main argument of the Ukrainian political 
establishment in favor of Ukraine‟s membership in NATO and demonstrated that 
bringing Ukraine into NATO will decrease rather than increase Ukrainian security. 
Although I have tried to concentrate on realism/neorealism to analyze Ukraine‟s and 
NATO‟s behavior toward each other and to address the Russian factor as the most 
important in the issue of Ukraine‟s membership in NATO, I am sure that it has been clear 
that my main argument against Ukrainian membership in NATO remains distant from the 
realist/neorealist position. Considering the arguments in this chapter, it should be 
apparent that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine‟s 
security concerns. The next chapter outlines that for the West, Ukraine‟s Euro-Atlantic 
integration means more than being a member of a collective security system.  
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IV. FROM SECURITY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CHANGING 
FACE OF NATO 
A. Argument 
While the previous chapter focused on the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into 
NATO mainly in the context of Ukraine‟s and Russia‟s security interests, this chapter 
takes the discussion outside the security concern of NATO enlargement with regard to 
Western interests. The chapter builds on the idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 left NATO without a clear threat, and this in turn led the Western military alliance 
to extend not only its geographical reach but also the scope of its operations. NATO‟s 
transformation has made it a different kind of organization that not only provides a 
defense for its members against any military challenge, but, more importantly, serves as a 
tool to promote the growth of capitalist neoliberal hegemonic ideology into Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
While proponents of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO argue that membership 
in the military alliance will serve as an incentive for domestic reforms and demonstrate 
Ukraine‟s commitment to Western norms of behavior, I situate the modernization of the 
state associated with NATO membership in connection with the continued domination of 
the Western socio-political and economic models over the global community. The aim of 
this chapter is to establish a starting point for explaining the idea that the development 
and the concept of modernization with its numerous strategies serve as a mechanism to 
ensure the survival of the capitalist world-economy and to advance the interests of the 
already developed countries of the West. For the purpose of this thesis, it should be clear 
that thinking of modernization and development in terms of power and discourse enables 
70 
 
us to see that neoliberalism, as a campaign of capitalist expansionism, involves an 
exercise of a hegemonic system of rule which represents our social reality and thereby 
enforces the domination of the U.S.-led Western knowledge and conceptions about the 
world.   
The current chapter provides the analysis of neoliberalism as philosophy and 
ideology and requires thinking about the issue of Ukraine‟s integration into NATO in 
terms of globalization and power relations. The analysis in this chapter is crucial for our 
understanding that along with other international organizations NATO participates in the 
process of the transformation of the state into a tool for correcting national socio-political 
and economic policies to the demands of global capitalist economy.
171
 In fact, to 
understand the argument that the concept of modernization and the politics of neoliberal 
development should be seen as a discourse of power and control, it is necessary to make a 
brief excursion into Immanuel Wallerstein‟s analysis of a capitalist world economy.  
Of course, it should be acknowledged once more that there is no single path to 
investigate the ways in which power operates. However, using the world-system 
conceptualization to provide an explanatory framework for the analysis of the issue of 
Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO helps us to unpack the complex processes of 
neoliberal legitimizing and institutionalization, involved behind the scenes. Furthermore, 
the chapter points to the neoliberal and complex regime of governance, which involves 
not only the issues of regulation and global stability but also the matters of discipline and 
control of individuals. 
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B. Hidden Agenda? Advancing Development 
Even if one accepts the argument that NATO is extremely important in pacifying 
European anxieties and deterring a potential aggressor, it is increasingly evident that the 
expansion of NATO and the incorporation of Ukraine into the Alliance is based on 
Western terms and is tied to the changes in the domestic political and socio-economic 
order of Ukraine. While liberal pluralists argue that international and non-governmental 
organizations, peace, trade and democracy are reciprocally reinforcing and necessary 
corollaries for promotion of political stability and military security in Europe and North 
America, they have trouble explaining why the process of NATO enlargement excludes 
Russia.
172
 It is also unclear why the Alliance with its Wilsonian principles of constructing 
peace along the lines of universal legal norms, liberal democracy, economic globalization 




With the disappearance of the Soviet threat and Western triumph in the Cold War, 
NATO lost its military role that in turn led to the necessity of reconstruction of its 
identity.
174
 As Steans and Pettiford summarized, “It did so by refocusing its aim to 
protect and spread liberal democracies, taking on board the liberal argument that 
democracies do not fight each other.”
175
 For Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, 
a crucial factor in reinventing of NATO‟s identity as a “democratic security community” 
was the problem of Russian post-Cold War self-identification and its choice between 
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Western and Eastern civilizations.
176
 Williams and Neumann are clear that while in the 
beginning of 1990‟s NATO started to be increasingly represented as a Western 
civilizational entity, under the pressure of communist-nationalist opposition and with 
regard to seventy years of Soviet history, Russia was bound to give up its early liberal-
internationalist position and demonstrate resistance to a Western civilization and NATO 
enlargement in particular. The Russian leadership was forced to choose between 
abandoning the agenda of the cultural argument and accept the enlargement of NATO, or 
remaining a counter-civilizational force and consequently entail an opposition to NATO 
enlargement only at the cost of being cast as an anti-Western, anti-democratic and neo-
imperialist state outside of the new Euro-Atlantic security community.
177
 Indisputably, 
Russia‟s move towards multilateral foreign policy and its Eurasian role has played into 
the hands of those who have perceived Russia as a threat and have stated that NATO 
should expand with or without Russian approval.
178
 Therefore, it is apparent that NATO‟s 
persistence and enlargement must be understood in the context of its transformation in its 
own identity where security, military, and culture have become increasingly tied to the 
issues of democracy and market economy.
179
 
Even though post-Cold War Russia has never been a threat to either Western or 
Eastern Europe, the perception that Russia poses an actual threat is necessary for the 
promotion of domestic reforms in new NATO member states.
180
 For Lars Skalnes, the 
very feelings of insecurity, which have pushed the countries of the former Soviet Bloc 
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toward NATO, provide an incentive for domestic reforms. The more a new member of 
the Alliance considers Russia as a potential threat to its security and the more NATO 
shows its commitments to its defense, the greater the influence of NATO membership on 
domestic politics and thus the foreign politics of this new member.
181
 Logically, Skalnes 
points out, that in order to sustain a belief that NATO offers a protection against a 
potential Russian aggression, and thus for NATO to maximize its impact on domestic 
politics of the NATO member state, Russia should be excluded from membership.
182
 
Such remarks reveal that the interest of NATO members in Ukraine‟s incorporation into 
the Alliance is very difficult to explain in the context of European security and 
demonstrates that NATO is one of the most important instruments at the disposal of 
Western policymakers to constructively integrate Ukraine into the community of 
countries that share political and economic values and principles.  
  In the minds of leading pro-Western Ukrainian politicians, Ukraine‟s membership 
in Euro-Atlantic security space means an improvement of investment climate, opening 
new economic possibilities and changes resulting in the increase of the welfare of 
Ukrainian citizens. The claim that NATO enrolment promotes democracy, free market 
values and paves the way for European Union membership provides an additional public 
justification for Ukrainian politicians to strive to enter the Euro-Atlantic security space in 
the period of transition from communism. Indeed, the fact of NATO‟s transformation 
from an exclusively military alliance with a clear enemy into a mechanism of promotion 
and strengthening of Western-defined norms and values suggest an idea that membership 
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in the Alliance is only an interim surrogate for the real goal of economic growth and 
development.
183
 While Western policymakers claim that the main factors hindering 
Ukraine‟s progress are domestic, the point of NATO‟s membership influencing domestic 
politics and extending the correct form of governance provides the evidence of NATO‟s 
playing an instrumentally considerable role on Ukraine‟s path to neoliberal development 
and transformation. In other words, Ukraine‟s ambition to join the NATO community 
should be viewed as a part of a broader structural policy of modernization which is 
equated with the neoliberal policy paradigm. 
C. Neoliberalism As the Only Path to Development   
“There is no Alternative”
184
 
Although, it is impossible to define neoliberalism in a clearly delinated set of 
constant features, it is not difficult to identify how neoliberal theories constitute the basis 
for development policies and strategies. If every country is different and the process of 
neoliberalization in each state can demonstrate remarkably rich details, with the most 
basic feature of systematic usage of state power to impose market imperatives, the overall 
picture is clear.
185
 Specifically, if markets do not exist in such fields as health care, 
education, land, water or social security, the government is not only responsible for a 
gradual establishment of a necessary structure for the markets, but also creates legal 
structures and operations to guarantee the proper functioning of markets.
186
 However, the 
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work of David Harvey and others makes it apparent that under neoliberalism the role of 
the state must be kept to a bare minimum of creating and preserving an institutional 
framework appropriate to neoliberal economic practices.
187
 According to this view, the 
main reason for developmental difficulties and slow economic growth has always been 
the inefficient role of the state and public sector. Therefore, in order to reach the ultimate 
goal of development through economic growth, it is necessary to rely on free market 
forces rather than on state intervention. 
 Neoliberal theorists recognize that “The free market will on average allocate 
resources much more efficiently than will the state, and this in turn will promote 
economic growth.”
188
 Broadly speaking, neoliberalism places a particular emphasis on 
the growth of a private sector which provides a higher level of accumulation of the 
capital and holds that state has to be withdrawn from areas of social provision. Whether 
there are better social welfare programs, laws that favor workers to join labor unions, or 
higher taxes on the corporations, neoliberal ideology opposes almost any activity or 
policy that can interact with or inhibit the free operation of markets.
189
 In this context, the 
role of the state is reduced to the preservation of pro-market institutional structures. As 
Wendy Larner points out, governments are now concerned with improving growth 
performance and market competition, rather than developing and promoting of policies to 
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guarantee a comprehensive social welfare system and full employment.
190
 The economic 
policy of neoliberalism lies primarily in its rejection of protectionism, which is regarded 
as the main cause of an inefficient economy. Thus, proponents of the neoliberal approach 
emphasize the importance of free markets, free trade and private property and believe that 
state involvement in economic affairs should be limited as much as possible.  
 Is There a Difference? The Evolution of Liberalism 
 Speaking of neoliberalism as a set of market-liberal economic policies tended to 
encourage the accumulation of capital and favoring laissez-faire economics, it is evident 
that the use of the term neoliberalism in the context of political economy is very often 
associated with the orthodox liberalism dated back to the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. There is no doubt that the basic principles of neoliberalism are built on the 
doctrines of famous economists of classical liberalism such as Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo and Jeremy Bentham who advocated for a minimal government intervention in 
economic matters and believed that it could be mutually beneficial if societies are able to 
trade freely with each other. It should be emphasized that liberal economists of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed that free market and open trade was the best 
way for any economy to develop and thereby to coordinate human activity. 
 Nevertheless, while Smith in his book The Wealth of Nations strongly supported 
free trade and explained how an unregulated market would naturally regulate itself via 
the hidden hand of individual‟s rational behavior, this does not mean that Smith viewed 
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the market “as a unilateral or unconditional policy.”
191
 Andrew Wyatt-Walter argues that 
there is “a considerable danger in interpreting Adam Smith's views on international 
relations” and makes it clear that for Smith government was necessary to protect society 
against corruption and unfair competition, violence, injustice, inequality and 
oppression.
192
 Moreover, being a great opponent of mercantilism, Smith accepted that the 
market would not be able to provide public goods on their own, and consequently 
government would need to provide public works and institutions for the benefit of the 
general populace, not a specific group of people.
193
  Similarly, Noam Chomsky 
emphasizes that at the heart of Smith‟s argument for free markets and free trade was 
always a demand for government‟s just regulation in the interests of all people.
194
 
Therefore, if Smith lived in our time and observed some of the typical manifestations of 
neoliberalism, he would in all likelihood perceive them very strange and objectionable.
195
  
The belief in the free market and market forces which has become a goal desired 
for its own sake is one of the reasons to differentiate between neoliberalism and classical 
liberalism.
196
 If classical liberalism concentrated on the importance of formal equality 
among people, placed greater emphasis on social groups and showed concern over 
unemployment and marginalization, neoliberal strategy of development places greater 
emphasis on narrow self-interest rather than mutual interest, profit rather than progress, 
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marketing and advertizing success instead of quality of the product. As Treanor 
emphasizes, “A general characteristic of neoliberalism is the desire to intensify and 
expand the market, by increasing the number, frequency, repeatability, and formalization 
of transactions.”
197
 It is a modern neoliberal theory that declares every human behavior to 
be grounded on maximizing material resources and public goods to be seen as individual 
wealth.  
Indeed, within neoliberal framework the interests of human beings are placed 
above the interests and principles of community and society, justice and moral values. In 
this context, Valentina Fedotova recognizes that while neoliberalism is reinforced by the 
cynical references to teachings of Smith, it is so detached from his theory that it 
completely distorts liberalism‟s leading principles.
198
 For Fedotova, such a deeply 
religious man and truly virtuous representative of his time as Adam Smith could not put 
the individual above society.
199
 While referring to the analysis of Smith‟s doctrine by 
Andy Denis, Fedotova emphasizes that, according to Smith, wise and virtuous 
individuals, trying to satisfy their own private interests, create an order around 
themselves with respect to the social order of which they are a part.
200
  
 In Smithian economics, private incentives were always aligned with social costs 
and benefits, which resulted in promotion of general welfare.
201
 Therefore, it should be 
apparent that for Smith the good of the society was unconditional primacy which has to 
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multiply the happiness of people. The emphasis on the idea that market economy 
contributes to a socially beneficial equilibrium leads Chomsky to argue that the basic 
ideas of orthodox liberalism are expressed not in the neo-classical or neoliberal theory 
but in the concepts and practices of the libertarian socialist movements.
202
  Ultimately, it 
should be clear that while the proponents of neoliberalism are convinced that they are 
carriers of ideas of classical economic liberalism, neoliberalism violates the basic 
principles of classical liberalism. 
 Much More Than Economic Theory 
 A scientific claim of human nature as wholly selfish and competitive forms any 
basis of neoliberalism.
203
 The idea that human beings are essentially self-interested has 
completely turned from scientific disposition into normative ethics which is structurally 
fundamental for all political, social and economic decisions in market society.
204
 For 
neoliberals, every human being is an entrepreneur whose actions are motivated solely by 
gaining material profits and maximizing their social status.
205
 Furthermore, all forms of 
relations, including relations between employees of one company are treated as sub-types 
of market competition. Hence, all types of social relations are based on the market-driven 
approach that claims that the usual purpose of human life is material acquisition. As 
Patrick Fitzsimons writes, “individuals who choose their friends, hobbies, sports, and 
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partners, to maximize their status with future employers, are ethically neoliberal.”
206
 
Thus, while individual relations with one another are not necessarily monetarised, the 
economic base of such relationship indicates at the “extension of the market principle 
into non-economic area of life.”
207
  
There is no difference between the market economy and market society.
208
 
Consequently, it should be immediately apparent that neoliberalism is not simply the 
approach to economics that subverts the bureaucratic government, stresses the 
importance of free trade and enhances the role of the private sector. Neoliberalism is also 
a modern version of social and political philosophy in which “the existence and operation 
of a market are valued in themselves, separately from any previous relationship with the 
production of goods and services.”
209
 More important, Henry Giroux suggests that 
neoliberalism has to be understood not only as the politico-economic movement designed 
to shift regulation of the economy from public to the private sector, but as a constructed 
ideology that spreads out its reach to icorporate all aspects of pedagogical, social, cultural 
and political life within the principles of a market society.
210
  
Clearly, neoliberalism is not simply one of the most pervasive ideologies of the 
twenty-first century, but something much more.
211
 Harvey provides a systematic 
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overview over the development of neoliberalism and claims that in order to occupy a 
commanding position in the global community, any economic doctrine or thought should 
appeal to our values, aspirations, abilities and opportunities.
212
 He claims that the 
founders of neoliberalism have used political ideals of individual freedom and human 
dignity as the basis of neoliberal content. Since the concepts of freedom and dignity are 
attractive to people in their own right, neoliberalism, through the rhetoric about the 
individual liberty and freedom of markets, has become especially widespread and 
successful after the wave of fascist and communist dictatorships.
213
  
Neoliberals have maintained that government is the enemy of the people and have 
fostered the illusion that the powerful state is responsible for all economic catastrophes. 
According to neoliberals, the fall of communism provided us with evidence that the 
command economy cannot be made to work.
214
 For the proponents of the neoliberal 
project, the state‟s inefficiency to allocate resources is a problem of all countries, but in 
the developing world where state officials are more likely to be corrupt it is a serious 
headache.
215
 Therefore, it is agreed by neoliberals that economic development and 
growth, associated with free market economy and free trade brings transparency, ensures 
good governance and promotes democracy. With a conviction that economic growth and 
profit-making are the fundamental principles of democracy, neoliberalism removes 
government control of market forces and observes an aggressive individualism.
216
 Thus, 
the pervasiveness of neoliberalism is evident by the claim of neoliberals that a process of 
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economic liberalization is taking place alongside the concepts of human dignity, 
democratization and individual freedom.  
Nevertheless, while liberals of all types argue that economic liberalization leads to 
political liberalization and eventually to democracy, neoliberalism as a theory does not 
explain how a political system should be organized.
217
 Neoliberal philosophy remains 
silent on whether or not a state should work either directly or through elected 
representatives.
218
 Furthermore, Thorsen and Lie are clear that “If the democratic process 
slows down neoliberal reforms, or threatens individual and commercial liberty, which it 
sometimes does, then democracy ought to be sidestepped and replaced by the rule of 
experts or legal instruments for that purpose.”
219
 Referring to Harvey, Thorsen and Lie 
conclude that radical free market policies could be enforced under the patronage of 
“autocrats as well as within liberal democracies.”
220
 More important, the designers of 
neoliberalism initially distanced themselves from free market liberalism calling for some 
government intervention to stimulate domestic economic growth.
221
 Ultimately, 
considering the plurality of views that has always existed within political and 
philosophical camps, various communities of intellectuals have managed to develop a 
plural set of ideas. In its turn, this has been constructed in quite diverse political systems 
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 While arguing that diverse political and economic paradigms only pretend to be 
critical of neoliberalism, Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhoffer are clear that the main task of 
neoliberalism is not to eliminate the state, but “rather to reduce its scope and redefine its 
role vis-à-vis market.”
223
 Therefore, neoliberalism cannot be understood as a complete 
political or economic theory or even a philosophy, but a plural set of concepts of how 
“the relationship between the state and its external environment ought to be 
organized.”
224
 Similarly, Wandy Larner argues that neoliberalism is a more complicated 
occurrence which should be seen as a contemporary form of politico-economic 
governance grounded on spreading of market relationships.
225
 More important, despite 
the different interpretations of neoliberalism, most of the critics agree that neoliberalism 
is a political and economic project of the trans-national upper class which under the mask 




D. About Capitalism 
A Reformulation of Wallerstein's Framework 
From the perspectives of Wallerstein‟s world-system approach, progress 
associated with modernization theory is simply an illusion, and ideological models of 
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development are necessary instruments for managing the global capitalist order. A world-
system evaluation of the progress for poor and underdeveloped countries is completely 
different from the idea that development and economic growth can be achieved through 
overcoming autochthonous traditional values and social structures.
227
 Even more 
important, the world-system approach rejects the alternate hypothesis, based on the 
dependency theory, claiming that the pattern of growth and development experienced by 
the advanced, high-consumption states would be a possibility on the account of internal 
change to socialism as an alternative to capitalist economic system.  
In his detailed studies of capitalism, Wallerstein continues the tradition of Marxist 
sociology and political economy and advances a theoretical and historical account of the 
origins and structure of the modern world-system as a capitalist world-economy.
228
 
According to Wallerstein, capitalism is not simply an arrangement of economic relations 
and legal norms, but an international system which has existed since the sixteenth century 
with its own hierarchy. The capitalist world-system emerged in the late Middle Ages as a 
result of the feudal crisis which threatened the ability of a privileged group of European 
elites to extract surplus value from the direct producers and thereby determine the way of 
socio-economic development.
229
 In fact, it is important to acknowledge that the capitalist 
system has not been the first world-economy ever, but the first world-economy to survive 
and to attain the phase of capitalist development where the whole world is operating 
within the frame of institutionally stabilized hierarchical and geographically extensive 
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social division of labor.
230
 Over the past five centuries, as Wallerstein writes, “the new 
system consolidated itself in Europe and went on from there to take over the world, in the 
process eliminating all alternative modes of social organization” and establishing new 
institutional frameworks, new forms of production processes, and new modes of labor 
control which have operated via mechanisms of market.
231
  
The characteristic feature distinguishing Wallerstein‟s world-system analysis 
from orthodox Marxism is a claim that the defining feature of capitalism is not a private 
ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange of commodities in 
markets, but constant maximization of production of surplus value, appropriated by the 
capitalist class which employs wage workers in production to generate profit. Wallerstein 
underlines that the fundamental force of the capitalist world economy is the “relationship 
between capital/labor and the extraction of surplus created by direct producers (labor), or 
by others (capitalists) either at the actual site of production or, later, when goods are 
exchanged in the market place.”
232
 In other words, Wallerstein perceives capitalism as a 
system whose existence is composed in continual and endless accumulation of capital, 
meaning that “people and firms are accumulating capital in order to accumulate more 
capital.”
233
 Because capital is accumulated by taking profits in the market, the key issue 
for capitalists is the production of goods at the much lower price than that for which they 
can be sold. By the logic of production, despite the continuous technological and 
organizational improvements, labor costs represent a principal and increasing proportion 
of the actual price for which services and products are sold.  
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When labor costs rise and eventually become too high for capitalist entrepreneurs, 
relocation of production to the places with historically lower salaries is an obvious 
response to overcome obstacles of capital accumulation. Thus, the ongoing division of 
labor of a capitalist global economy divides production into core-like, semi-peripheral 
and peripheral goods and services and thereby leads to an unequal exchange of products 
in such a way that there is “a constant flow of surplus-value from the producers of 
peripheral products to the producers of core-like products.”
234
 In fact, arguing that the 
segmentation of the world along the categorical boundaries and conceptual framework is 
a function of the capitalist world system, Wallerstein explores inequality and uneven 
development across societies through a world-wide division of labor with a structured 
circle of production processes interacting with each other through the market.
235
  
Briefly About Class, State and the Core/Periphery Hierarchy 
In this regard, it is appropriate to underline that the major institutions of the 
capitalist world-economy are markets, states, classes, households, and identities.
236
 As 
Andrew Savchenko notes, “All of these are mere readjustments of the division of labor 
within one giant capitalist enterprise.”
237
 Accordingly, this means that political and 
economic forms of organization which are drawn into a single global system are 
reciprocally connected and work to support a capitalist kind of social order. 
  While in the capitalist mode of production much of the surplus value takes the 
form of material profit extracted from labor and taken by capitalists, it should be clear 
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that there are two basic social classes which have different interests.
238
 Robinson refers 
the concept of class to the “group of people who share a common relationship to the 
process of social production and reproduction and are constituted relationally on the basis 
of social power struggles.”
239
 In his work, Robinson especially deals with the issue of 
global capitalism and the process of transnational class formation while arguing that 
“class formation is an ongoing historical process and refers to changes over time in the 
class structure of society, including the rise of new class groups and the decline of old 
ones.”
240
 Therefore, drawing upon the orthodox Marxist thought, it makes sense to 
conclude that “capitalism is characterized by a ruling class (bourgeoisie), which 
owns/controls the means of production, and the working class (proletariat), who must sell 
their labor to survive.”
241
 Furthermore, Robinson makes it clear that the comprehensive 
study of the concept of class can involve an identification of different fractional interests 
within each of the classes.
242
 While class analysis is complex, I argue that the study of 
capitalist political economy and full understanding of capitalist society is impossible 
without an analysis of class structure. 
Overall, my point is that the conflict between various incompatible interests is 
represented by the concept of class struggle and capitalism is an exploitative economic 
system with its own tensions and struggles.  Although my study does not directly focus 
on the specific aspects of class structure, it does weigh heavily on the issues of 
transnational class formation. What should be clear is that in the current phase of global 
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capitalism, we are witnessing the process of transition from national to transnational class 
formation. “As national productive structures become transnationally integrated, world 
classes whose organic development took place through the nation – state are experiencing 
supranational integration with „national‟ classes of other countries,” according to 
Robinson.
243
 The emphasis here is that at the present time this process of transnational 
class formation takes place through promotion of globalized consumerist culture, 
ideology and institutional framework.  
Within the Marxist tradition, the role of the state in the process of mediating a 
conflict resulting from class struggle is extremely important. If for the realist thinkers, the 
state is a sovereign actor representing the interests of the whole nation, in my study I 
reject state-centrism and consider state as not the basic unit of the system of international 
relations but as a constructed political organization which initially came into view at the 
time of early capitalist development in Europe and was placed in a hierarchical order. As 
Wallerstein notes, “The sovereign states became the primary political units organizing the 
necessary flow of the factors of production” and enabling the extraction of surplus value 
from wage labor in production activity via market mechanisms.
244
 Similarly, Savchenko 
writes that “Nations and states are but a veil thrown by world capitalism onto its giant 
mechanism for the extraction of surplus.”
245
 Therefore, the state system was structured 
not only to ensure the transfer of surplus-value from direct producers to elite classes, but 
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In this way, in order to maintain conditions favorable to economic growth and 
secure the rule of capital, capitalist classes across nations cooperate with each other. This 
means, in turn, that  social relationships as well as inter-state relations are determined by 
the structure of the capitalist economic system “which gives priority to the endless 
accumulation of capital” and operates according to the principles of discrimination and 
exploitation.
247
 In fact, the processes of oppression and manipulation are extremely 
necessary for the capitalist socio-political and economic order as they contribute to 
inequality which in its turn diminishes the number of the players in the capitalist system 
and thereby restricts the range of interests.
248
  
Being focused on the unlimited accumulation of capital as the main driving force 
of the capitalist global economy, Wallerstein‟s world system-theory categorizes every 
state in the world as capitalist. As part of the modern world system, no country has 
developed in isolation and has had to accumulate capital in order to survive. In arguing 
this way, Wallerstein flatly denies the widespread view that after the Second World War 
there were two types of world system, known to us as socialist and capitalist. 
Consequently, the assumption that Soviet Union has always been a fundamental part of 
the capitalist world-economy allows us to “see beyond ideological labels and into the 
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very nature of relations of production.”
249
 In this context, I agree with Andrew Linklater 
who points out that it has always been crucial for the state to construct a national 
ideology to incorporate the majority of the population and thereby to guarantee the 
survival of capitalism.
250
 What Linklater‟s analysis brings out is the idea that the survival 
of capitalism depends on multiple combinations of consent and coercion in which the 
interests of the ruling class compromise with the demands coming from inferior social 
forces. In other words, the dominant class is more likely to achieve its class goals under 
the banner of popular interests.
251
  
Similarly, Gill argues that “The central goal of socialism and social democracy 
was not the replacement of capitalism, but civilizing the capitalist mode of 
production.”
252
 Therefore, the logic of this thinking suggests that we look at the Soviet-
type economies in a different light and classify the Soviet-type economies as state 
capitalism.
253
 In this regard, ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the 
United States occurred in parallel with a conflict between classes within and across states 
in the capitalist world-system.
254
 It also reflected the struggle for monopoly power within 
the world-system both before and immediately after World War II. Gill is clear that after 
the Wall Street crash in 1929 the world economy fragmented into economic blocs and the 
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worldwide depression of the 1930s led to intensified class struggle between social forces 
in favor of capital and against capital.
255
  
While building on the classical Marxist idea that the relationships between 
capitalists and working classes are characterized by unjust and exploitative nature, 
Wallerstein divides the world into the most powerful states and those which are 
dependent on them. In his conceptualization of global capitalist economy, scholar 
ascribes the terminology of “core” and “periphery” to the states in terms of ownership 
and production processes and calls the degree of profitability of the production activities 
a “core-periphery relationship.”
256
 While less developed states are called periphery and 
they are financially and technologically dependent on other actors of international 
system, core states are those among major world powers with considerable military 
strength and a high degree of autonomy. Worth mentioning is the fact that Wallerstein 
assumes also the existence of states that have a relatively even mix of production of core-
like and peripheral goods, and refers to them as to a “semi-periphery.” The major concern 
of semi-peripheral states is to “keep themselves from slipping into the periphery and to 
do what they can to advance themselves toward the core.”
257
  
At the first glance, it might be tempting to think about the existence of semi-
periphery as a model of economic success and as a result of modernization. However, 
following Wallerstein, it is clear that some obvious countries to be labeled semi-
peripheral are necessary for the stabilization of the capitalist world-economy which is 
achieved though the creation of the illusion of progress and elimination of unified 
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opposition to core states. Therefore, the arrangement of the capitalist world-economy 
consists of a tripartite division of labor which resulted in disproportionate exchange 
favoring strong states and undermining the resource base of the weakest. Specifically, 
weak states, in most cases, produce primary products like raw materials and supply 
industrialized capitalists with productive and cheap labor. Major sectors of the peripheral 
economies are organized in a way to serve the interests of the core states rather than to 
meet the needs of the local population. In contrast, the strong states, while emphasizing 
their role of guarding quasi-monopolies of the core-like production activity, “relate to 
weak states by pressuring them to keep their frontiers open to those capital flows which 
are useful and profitable to firms located in the strong states.”
258
 On this basis, the 




The elites of the core pursue the integration of the intermediary constituents 
within the ruling class of peripheral and semi-peripheral states into the structures and 
processes of the capitalist world economy for the purpose of supporting the core‟s 
economic domination and guarantee the rule of capital in particular.
260
 Furthermore, the 
promotion of a stable form of world order is the ultimate goal of the alliance between the 
ruling classes of the capitalist states. In this context, depending on the numerous 
economic, political and geographic factors, the role of each state is very different. 
However, once again, relations between states are structured hierarchically, and flow of 
capital between those who are powerful and those who are poor is asymmetrical. In brief, 
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the entire state structure of the capitalist world economy not only “maintains conditions 
conductive to economic growth,” but also allows an unequal exchange of goods and 
services in such a way that much of the surplus value obtained in the marginal areas of 
the world-economy is transferred to the economically developed zones.
261
 
  While the proponents of dependency theory focus strictly on the concept of core-
periphery relationship, Wallerstein‟s world-system theory centers on the entire global 
system currently functioning within the frame of a singular division of labor and 
numerous cultural systems. The point is that if the dependency approach views the 
positions of the states within the system of international relations as differentiated, 
Wallerstein and other scholars who work under a world-system framework argue that the 
set of circumstances for each state is hierarchically ordered and the possibilities open to 
states for development or capital accumulation are “shaped by the cyclical and secular 
evolution of the world system as a whole.”
262
 Peter Evans is clear that “Neither the 
concrete forms of production associated with a given structural position, nor the 
structural position assumed by a given nation” should be seen as fixed.
263
  It follows from 
world-system theorists that hierarchy is absolutely essential and has to be maintained for 
the continuation of a world capitalist economy, and “leaving one structural position 
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For this reason, it should be pointed out that the relations within and between 
states are in a constant conflict and disharmony which are rooted in the structural 
relations of domination and dependence. The competition between various social forces, 
rivalry between leading state actors, and the endeavors of peripheral or semi-peripheral 
states to improve their status lead to an ongoing clash of interests, contradictions, and 
tensions which eventually result in repressive relationships or direct conflicts.
265
 Clearly, 
the hierarchical frameworks in which capitalist relations take place determine conflict as 
a central and structural process in the capitalist world-system. It is not the anarchy of the 
state system, as realists‟ claim, which is the major problem of international relations, but 
rather the conflictual and repressive nature of the capitalist socio-political and economic 
organization.
266
   
E. Geoculture and Capitalism. Connection 
What Is It All About?  
On the basis of the previous section it is fair to say that an unjust social and 
economic capitalist order is maintained and legitimized by a range of practices, belief 
systems, institutions and ideologies. The combination of these elements helps to organize 
relationships between states and classes, social movements and oppositional groups.
267
 
This idea closely relates to the realist concept of hegemonic stability which claims that 
the dominance of certain major states or one hegemonic state is necessary for the 
international economic system to be more open and stable, or in our case, to legitimize 
capitalist rule. As we already have seen, Wallerstein confirms this idea by claiming that 
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besides states and inter-state system, the capitalist world-economy requires the 
appearance of repeated and in most cases relatively brief hegemonic powers.
268
 In fact, 
scholars generally agree that when a dominant or hegemonic state is lacking in power, 
economic stability is very difficult to maintain. 
Nevertheless, if major approaches to international relations theory employ the 
concept of hegemony to describe the power of a predominant state in the system of 
international relations based solely on the military and economic component, building on 
the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and on the works of leading critical theorists, I argue that, 
in the modern capitalist world, hegemony in addition to military and economic status 
should be viewed in terms of culture and ideology. Indeed, through culture and ideology  
particular capitalist states and social forces define the rules of the game, exercise their 
power, use it to assert authority and domination, and more importantly, to achieve the 
endless accumulation of capital. This means that power of the ruling class and core states 
does not consist only of violence and coercion, but also on consent and persuasion.  
Such kind of hegemony at the international level demands “more than a single 
balance of power or an order between states, since it also involves the complex patterns 
of social relations which connect social classes in a range of countries.”
269
 As Gill writes, 
global hegemony occurs when there is strong agreement between these social classes 
across all levels. The scholar makes it clear that hegemony would be entirely 
accomplished when the key institutions and socio-political and economic forms of 
organization in addition to the vital values of the superior capitalist state develop into 
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models for imitation in other peripheral and inferior states.
270
 Finally, the upshot of the 
argument is that the international hegemony should not be viewed solely in a state-centric 
terms, but needs to be seen as a system of rule premised upon ideas and cultural 
apparatus which has for its origins the outward expansion of the power and influence of 
the dominant capitalist groups in the leading capitalist states.
271
  
According to the Gramscian analysis, hegemony is the consequence of struggle 
between leading social classes. It is a situation under which sufficient levels of agreement 
between classes that stand oppose to each other is reached. While hegemony is perceived 
to be built on the active and broad measure of consent, “it functions according to basic 
principles that ensure the continuing supremacy of leading social classes.”
272
 Thus, 
hegemony is not based simply on consent, but on actively sympathetic agreement, in 
which general populace wants what the ruling class requires. In a similar vein, Cohn 
states that “A dominant class that rules only by coercion is not hegemonic in Gramscian 
terms because its power does not extend throughout society and it can be overthrown 
simply by physical force.”
273
 Cohn is clear that in order to maintain their power, 
dominant social classes must gain consent of subaltern classes on the basis of common 
material interests, ideas and shared values. In fact, hegemony involves not only 
persuasion and legitimate forms of rule, but also should constitute a whole way of life.
274
 
Thus, for the reason that hegemony seems to assume responsibility for not only a 
peaceful order but a more favorable future for everybody, it is widely accepted by 
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 Thus, hegemony creates the kind of stability within which the 
dominant ruling group legitimizes and maintains its power and thereby subordinates 
social classes which, being unaware that they are oppressed, view the capitalist‟s 
hegemony as perfectly legitimate.
276
  
While acknowledging that societies are always to some extent undergoing forms 
of structural change and transition and hegemony is a dynamic and continuous process, 
both culture and ideology are, in themselves, powerful instruments working to support 
and question the existing capitalist order.
277
 Wallerstein argues that the concepts of 
culture and ideology should be seen as a system of values, rules and practices that 
consciously and unconsciously manage social relations through encouragement and 
penalties, and thereby create the system of illusions that persuade members of societies in 
the legitimacy of a particular socio-political and economic order.  In this context, Gill is 
clear that in its negative usage, ideology represents the Marxist idea of false 
consciousness and refers to the false and real interests of social classes.
278
  
While at the level of domestic politics the hegemony of the capitalist bourgeoisie 
operates through a variety of educational institutions, trade unions, political parties, and 
associations, at the international level it performs through the international organizations 
and more precisely through the outward spread of Western military, economic, political, 
and cultural power. All these forces gradually inspire the masses to accept certain ideas 
that justify the domination of the ruling class and represent their supremacy as natural 
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and immutable. It is more important, however, to understand that that the main force 
behind the spread of hegemony is an intellectual intelligentsia. Intellectuals, as Gramsci 
argued, should be seen as the instruments for dominant social classes to provide the 
consent of the general public. In the majority of instances, in the case of social conflict, 




 Liberal Ideology as a Force to Discipline Labor 
Despite the fact that a capitalist world-economy has been in existence since the 
sixteenth century, its geoculture, which Wallerstein defines as a framework of beliefs and 
values within which a capitalist world-economy operates, appeared in the wake of French 
Revolution.
280
 Like any culture, the geoculture has developed and changed. The way in 
which the shift of geoculture has occurred and will continue to do so is due to an 
ideological orientation. Once again, ideology is not simply a set of ideas or theories, but a 
systematic strategy in the social arena which anticipates “that there exist competing 
groups with competing long-term strategies of how to deal with change and who best 
should take the lead in dealing with it.”
281
  If before the French Revolution the dominant 
group of people used the power of the state to force the subordinate group of people to 
alienate control of labor power, after the period of radical social and political upheavals 
in Europe a capitalist system of production started to be based upon the system of wage 
payment. While referring to the analysis of capitalism by Nicos Poulantzas, Linklater 
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emphasizes that because a capitalist system of production switched to the mode of 
contract between the dominant and exploited class of people, capitalism applied ideas of 




Thus, it is appropriate to remember that in the capitalist global economy, the 
entire system operates to keep out the majority of the population from the benefits of the 
capitalist economic system “by including in the work-system in a layered hierarchy all 
the worlds potential force.”
283
 In Wallerstein‟s words, “This system of exclusion via 
inclusion was infinitely strengthened by the diffusion in the nineteenth century of a 
dominant liberal ideology which justified this exclusion via inclusion, and managed to 
harness even the world's antisystemic forces to this task.”
284
 It is evident from these 
formulations that the concept of ideology should be understood as the reflection of the 
worldview of the fraction of society which in most cases implies the negative aspect of 
reproducing beliefs and values in other classes which serve to deprive their specific 
interests.
285
 Futhermore, the point should be made that liberalism, being composed of 
political extremes between which liberal ideology falls, has always sought to define the 




As Wallerstein argues, liberalism was the predominant ideology during two 
centuries from 1789 to the year of 1989, the same time that so called Communism and an 
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ideological force of Marxism-Leninism collapsed. Accordingly, during this period of the 
triumph and collapse of liberalism as the hegemonic ideology, the reality of ideological 
consensus stood behind the mask of ideological conflict from which one can draw certain  
conclusions. Worth noting that for Wallerstein, a great ideological antinomy of the 
twentieth century between Wilsonianism and Leninism was constructed as a mechanism 
for the political integration of the periphery and semi-periphery into the capitalist world-
system and to shift the industrialized production of goods and services into those less 
developed zones.
287
 At first glance, it might be tempting to think about the rivalry of two 
ideological doctrines as real and intense, however, according to Wallerstein, the 




 In brief, the idea of proletarian insurrection against the bourgeoisie degenerated 
into the theory of anti-imperialism and turned into support for nationalist and liberation 
movements which were only an expression of classical liberal presuppositions.
289
 Thus, 
according to Wallerstein, Leninism, being a great adversary of liberal-socialism at the 
national arena, resembled the liberal socialism at the international level.
290
 Clearly, a 
consequence, promised by both ideologies of Wilsonianism and Leninism was “closing 
the gap between the rich countries and poor.”
291
 As a result, the entire system of 
nationalist regimes was established in order to move along the path of decolonization and 
national development which was defined as following the advice of either the West or the 
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East, and eventually to “catch up.” It should be pointed out that while there were 
differences between Wilsonian and Leninist ideological canons about the road to self-
determination of the peoples of the peripheral zones, decolonization was the fundamental 
task for them.  Therefore, to explore further, Wallerstein makes it clear that “with the 
ideologies elaborated and constrained, with the antisystematic movements channeling the 
energies of discontent,” all sociopolitical strategies, decisions and knowledge are the 





Although it may seem logical to argue that a balance-of-threat theory provides the 
most convincing explanation of why certain Ukrainian elites want to join NATO, it is 
quite unwise not to refer to economic and sociological approaches that contribute to our 
understanding of the issue of Ukraine‟s joining NATO. If in the previous chapter I 
generally demonstrated that incorporation of Ukraine into NATO would increase the 
security risks of the Alliance members and at the same time would not produce net 
security benefits for Ukraine, in this chapter I show that neoliberal principles, values, 
rules and norms of socio-economic and political order are one of the most important 
factors in further NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe. While the balance-of-threat 
approach to NATO enlargement explains the motivation of Ukrainian policymakers for 
their interest in NATO membership because of fear of a future Russian threat, “it cannot 
account for NATO‟s enlargement decisions.”
293
 True, NATO‟s further Eastern 
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enlargement and bringing Ukraine into Alliance are neither efficient nor necessary to 
increase the security of old members of the Alliance and cannot address the security 
problems in post Cold War Europe. 
  If we perceive Russia as a potential threat we focus our attention on the Russian 
power and its offensive capabilities, it becomes clear that Russia cannot pose a threat to 
either old or new members of the Alliance.
294
 The point is that the political rhetoric 
around the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO is overblown and is used 
instrumentally to represent the arguments of the pro-NATO forces as “legitimate and to 
persuade the audience of the legitimacy of their claims in order to elicit political support 
and induce political cooperation.”
295
 According to Schimmelfening‟s analysis of NATO 
enlargement process, the proponents of Ukraine‟s NATO integration use arguments, 
based on notions of security and stability, “to shame the opponents into compliance” and 
to mobilize social pressure through manipulation of public opinion.
 296
  
The discussion in this chapter contributes to the argument that an attempt to turn 
Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine‟s security concerns, but by strong 
Western interests, especially economic. Very clearly, Ukraine is in the periphery of the 
global capitalist system. Ukrainians live under poor socio-economic conditions not 
because they are worse or less intelligent than Westerners, but because Ukraine is at the 
bottom of hierarchical economic pyramid, within which the distribution of the 
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global surplus value and capital accumulation takes place.
297
 The achievement of a 
greater competitive advantage for Ukraine under the conditions of globalization is 




What I am getting at is the fact that Ukrainian society has become increasingly 
class divided around national circuits of accumulation, and social power struggle is a 
predominant locus of contemporary Ukraine. In its turn, powerful economic forces under 
the banner of globalization and international cooperation not only redefine and reinforce 
the relations between social classes and groups within Ukraine, but construct the basis for 
the incorporation of Ukrainian capitalist class into transnational structure. Therefore, it is 
crucial to understand that the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO should be 
regarded as a part of the processes of consolidation of neoliberal capitalism and 
transnational class formation. 
While arguments between markets versus state positions have always been central 
ideological themes of policy-making process in different time and various states, I argue 
that ideological disputes between various development doctrines, models and theories are 
operating within the frame of a single capitalist system.
299
  In fact, fostered by neoliberal 
economists, another kind of modernization theory has become dominant, according to 
which every country needs to introduce and advance neoliberal reforms, which boil down 
to complete privatization, deregulation of prices with national currencies, and promotion 
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of free competition. In this light, promotion of democracy is one of the main priorities at 
which the project of neoliberalism aims and such organization as NATO has been 
transformed to defend that kind of democracy.  
One should not miss the point that the basis of the neoliberal political program has 
become a consensus of the rulers and the ruled which consists of the need for mass 
participation in the political process. It is important to underline that the consolidation of 
so called democratic procedures for decision making and consolidation of neoliberal 
economic reforms are closely intertwined with each other. In essence, the process of 
openness and democratization advances the cause of commitment to promote a difficult 
economic policy reforms, contributing to economic growth over the longer run, by 
exposing the inefficiencies of authoritarian rule to competitive politics.
300
 Specifically, 
through exploitation of crisis conditions and managing opposition, new democratic 
governments initiate economic reform policies.  But is it a democracy when two or three 
identical political parties with almost the same political agendas, dispensed with 
enormous financial resources, share the power and regularly replace each other on the 
governmental positions? Is there a presence of a civil society in which ethnic politics is 
organized, competitive and linked to party politics?
301
  
Elections have become rituals around the world and the development of stable 
politics and the free market economy in the countries of the former Soviet Union has 
become a strategic goal for the Western governments.
302
 The illusion of democracy takes 
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away the right from the people to make even simple political or economic decisions, and 
namely NATO contributes to the complete liquidation of the meaning of the people as the 
source of power. The case of the Ukrainian government‟s determination to intensify 
cooperation with NATO, without taking notice of the people of Europe's second largest 
country, proves the correctness of the words stated above.  
Not only neoliberal policies such as trade liberalization and privatization 
accompany the process of democratization, but also, in the case of failed states, the 
humanitarian interventions are applied.
303
 In this respect, it is appropriate to comment 
Gramsci that any radical change or action should be preceded by the consent and 
hegemony. For example, today political leaders are able to achieve through democratic 
consent what Pinochet succeeded to achieve through state violence in Chile. The ideas of 
individualism, freedom and democracy have become globally spread and the economic 
stagnations have been interpreted as a crisis of governance. Therefore, if in the 1950s and 
1960s the argument was made that democracy would follow development as a result of 
economic growth and political modernization, in the 1990s it became clear that 
democratization has become one of the essentials for the promotion of free market 
policies and consequently economic growth.
304
   
Finally, this chapter has called attention to the idea that the consensus around the 
democratic norms and consumerism in today‟s globalized world is the structural power of 
increasingly united global elite to enforce discipline through the market. As Robinson 
notes, “The shift from authoritarianism to polyarchy as the dominant form of political 
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authority in much of the world represents a shift from coercive to consensual forms of 
social control at the transnational level.”
305
 Clearly, at a time when the debate concerning 
the issue of theoretical foundations of neoliberalism deepens, neoliberalism violates all 
the principles of liberalism, which supposedly made it a slogan. While the neoliberal 
ideology demonstratively refers to all kind of liberties and human rights, in reality it 
brings out the interests of the mega capital forces.
306
 In this context, Wallerstein is 
completely right in claiming that liberalism had collapsed. Nevertheless, it is wise to 
remember that while some are saying that the history of liberalism and capitalism has 
ended, neoliberalism has triumphed precisely in its most radical liberal forms both at 
practice and at the level of ideology. Neoliberal capitalism has become not simply a more 
prevalent force in contemporary human lives, but a unique and uniform global system of 
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V.  THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NATO - FROM DEVELOPMENT TO GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE? 
A. Argument 
 In this chapter I demonstrate that the extension of NATO should be seen as an 
extension of multiple forms of power, and the issue of Ukraine joining Euro-Atlantic 
Alliance should be examined in the context of the U.S. state‟s interests alongside 
capitalist systematic interests and values. I view the process of NATO expansion as the 
maintaining of America‟s grand strategy of openness that “derives directly from U.S. 
principles and practices elaborated and implemented during and even before the Cold 
War.”
307
 The argument I develop below considers NATO expansion nothing more than 
the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the post-Soviet space which aims at the 
consolidation of free market reform, and thereby moves forward commercial interests.  
It should be obvious that NATO should be regarded as a multilateral organization 
whose evolution has been connected with the development of modern capitalism. To be 
precise, in the second half of the twentieth century the capitalist world, under the banner 
of decolonization and the guidance of the Bretton Woods system, entered the new phase 
of the process of accumulating power in which international institutions, working under 
the influence of the U.S. political establishment, have devoted themselves to the 
reconstruction of the bureaucracies of the Third World and transforming government 
policies  to serve the interests of the rich states and maintain their dominance.
308
 
Therefore, as the analysis in the preceding chapters has demonstrated, NATO should not 
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be simply regarded as a military institution, but as one of the central institutional 
instruments at the disposal of Western policymakers to ease the transition of post-Soviet 
countries into a full-fledged market economy. 
B. From Colonialism to International Regulation 
Steans and Pettiford correctly point out that Wallerstein‟s world systems approach 
provides us a possibility to look in an entirely different light on the concept of economic 
development and the process of decolonization.
309
 In fact, any logical attempt to 
understand the operation of the global capitalist economy must include an analysis of 
decolonization as one of two main geopolitical events in the post-Second World War 
period that has allowed massive expansion and further development of capitalism.
310
 
Based on Wallerstein‟s analysis, Steans and Pettiford suggest an idea that the end of 
colonialism cannot be seen as indicating the end of oppression and exploitation of the 
poor, agricultural states by industrialized and developed nations. Scholars recognize that 
the formal end of colonialism simply transforms the nature of colonialism from a direct 
type, based on military occupation, to an indirect form based on economic arrangements 
and production of knowledge.
311
 The fundamentals and instruments of the neo-colonial 
policies have become loans, different types of financial and political assistance provided 
through foreign and national companies.
312
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In this context, I argue that colonialism should not be seen simply as an 
uncultivated method of military and political domination of the peoples of the non-
Western world by European powers, but as a necessary measure of capitalist economic 
system to extend the global market and to provide the access to the resources of cheap 
labor, land and raw materials. It was only after successfully engaging indigenous 
populations to the civilized world, which destroyed their traditional way of life and 
imposed Western values, when the promotion of state sovereignty along with capitalist 
expansion took place.
313
 The declaration of independence of former colonies did not 
mean to guarantee complete sovereignty of young states. On the contrary, through joining 
the United Nations and other international institutions former colonies have been 
integrated into the political and bureaucratic systems of the metropolitan structure. In 
essence, having become tightly attached to capitalism, peoples of the former colonies did 
not have any choice, but to follow the development strategies of the West, directed at the 
restructuring of class relations. This resulted in accelerated integration of the working-
class masses, exchange markets on a global basis and internationalization of production.  
Post-war Keynesian Consensus  
There cannot be any room for doubt that institutional transformations that have 
their origins in the West and the development of modern capitalism are coincidental and 
interconnected processes. As Harvey confirms, “the restructuring of international 
relations after the Second World War was designed to prevent a return to the catastrophic 
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conditions that had threatened the capitalist order in the period of the 1930s.”
314
 In 
particular, with the decolonization of much of the Third World a new hegemonic world 
order based upon the regulation of inter-state conflict along with globally conceived civil 
society has started to form.  
For Mann as for Wallerstein, decolonization means largely the process which 
“ended segmentation of the world economy into separate imperial zones,” and has been 
typically tied to capitalist development and industrialization.
315
 While prior to the Second 
World War there were multiple dominant centers of capitalism operating on the global 
scale, after 1945 there was a shift towards a more simple, a collective center of the world 
capitalist system.
316
 According to Samir Amin, the new collective center and expansion 
of capitalism has become the ensemble of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. 
Therefore, the role of the United States as a hegemonic power should be situated in its 
relation with this collective center of the capitalist world system.
317
  Furthermore, the 
political and social changes since the Second World War signify the development of a 




Based on Gramscian concept of “passive revolution,” it is argued that the post-
1945 world order was reformed to establish advanced methods of capitalist production 
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worldwide and to consolidate ruling capitalist class.
319
 The term “passive revolution” 
refers to the process of gradual transformation of socio-political and economic order in 
the way to legitimize the rule of the leading capitalist forces.
320
 Therefore, it is necessary 
to emphasize that while the Bretton Woods system aimed to spread the principles of free 
market internationally and encourage open competition, it allowed governments to 
intervene in the domestic economy to pursue full employment and prevent disruptive 
capital flows. Thus, the Bretton Woods system should be seen as an international 
economic order in which the general fundamentals of liberalism were “embedded.” 
Overall, as Cohn summarizes, “Policies to promote openness in the global economy 
included measures to cushion domestic economies, and policies to provide domestic 
stability in turn were designed to minimize interference with expansion of the global 
economy.”
321
 In other words, in the absence of capitalist hegemony, comprehensive and 
slower transformation of the socio-political and economic order in the form of Fordist 
production and Keynesian macroeconomic management took place.  
Awakened by the oppressiveness of politico-economic and social orders, former 
colonial states were encouraged by the Western countries to develop capitalist economies 
through engaging in free trade enterprise. This advancement of market mechanisms in the 
developing world was believed not only to put an end to the backwardness of the peoples, 
but more important, to ensure that Third World states did not fall into the hands of 
socialist regimes. Paul Baran is clear that while “the military performance of the Soviet 
Union during the war and the rapid recovery of its war-ravaged economy provided the 
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final proof of the strength and viability of a socialist society”, in the context of the Cold 
War, the United States and other Western capitalist countries were put in fear of “the 
spectacular advance and expansion of the world‟s socialist camp.”
322
 Therefore, the idea 
of economic growth and modernization as an outcome of power politics won backing 
from across the political and economic spectrum in the newly independent and less 
developed countries.  
The end of the Second World War brought changes in the conceptual 
development doctrine.
323
 Rather than emphasizing spontaneous development from below, 
development and progressive social change has come to be associated with 
Westernization, or more accurately, Americanization. After the victory over fascism, the 
idea that the United States is the source of modernity has started to spread out from a 
Western core to the rest of the world. In fact, the Fordist form of production, the 
democratic form of state and the American form of civil society have become models to 
follow throughout the world.
324
 However, despite the increasing power of financial 
markets and determination of the neo-classical liberal views, only a few countries 
followed the approach of the completely unregulated market economy.
325
 
Although the postwar international economic architecture owed much to the 
laissez-faire doctrine of orthodox liberals, the ideas of John Keynes on international and 
national economic planning had a significant impact on the post-war economic thought. 
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While neoclassical liberal architects of the post-war institutional order argued that capital 
controls contributed to the 1930s Great Depression and consequently to World War II, 
Keynesian economists believed that a self-regulating market was to be blamed for those 
disasters.
326
 Speaking in favor of increases in spending on social programs by state, 
followers of Keynesianism promoted the idea of government‟s intervention in the process 
of production and distribution to protect the economy from the influence of the capitalist 
cycle.  Despite the clash of economic ideas and ideologies, post-war architects came to a 
compromise and designed the international economic framework on the basis of 
interventionist liberal policies. Taking into account the social turmoil against unrestrained 
market forces and the threat of continued class struggle, this kind of strategy was 




If economic growth became conceived as the primary criterion of development, it 
had to be accompanied by the establishing of Western policies which promote 
privatization and deregulation, consolidate democracy and encourage trade and capital 
market liberalization. It became widely believed that political institutions along with 
economic growth were the main policy objectives that are the necessary for moving an 
economy of the state out of negative macroeconomic indicators into a positive.
328
 
According to Steans and Pettiford, “International institutions were thought to be 
increasingly necessary as a complement to states, whose individual capabilities to deal 
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with problems generated by new technologies were decreasing.”
329
 While arguing that 
various kinds of institutions and agencies in different ways shape social, political and 
economic behavior, William Garside is clear that there has emerged a general consensus 
among modern economists that only through the complex system of international 
institutions, both formal and informal, the invisible hand of the market can perform well 
and eventually lead to economic growth.
330
 If, according to a liberal perspective, pre-
World War II economic rules and institutions were weak and disruptive, the agreements 
laid down at Bretton Woods in 1944 established a new framework for international peace 
and cooperation which consisted of three international economic institutions – the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
 For liberal thinkers, these institutions have been part of a complex structural 
framework and have played a crucial role in determining not only the post-war world 
economy, but also global peace and justice. In fact, the liberal study of international 
interdependence emphasized that institutionalized application of market principles would 
allow all human beings to enjoy the benefits of material progress equally. By rejecting an 
assumption that conflict between states is natural, liberals argued that these new forms of 
international political organization were necessary to manage both social and economic 
relations. For example, while one of the main functions of the Bretton Woods system was 
to avoid the competitive devaluation of currencies, “the IMF was created to monitor a 
system of pegged or fixed exchange rates, in which each currency had an official 
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exchange rate in relation to gold or the U.S. dollar.”
331
 In contrast to the IMF‟s ability to 
make short-term loans for the purpose of maintaining the pegged exchange rates, the 
IBRD or World Bank has been able to help countries (first Europe, then developing) with 
long-term loans needed for the various reconstruction projects. In sum, the predominant 
conviction of liberal thinkers after the Second World War was that the cause of the war 
was the economic breakdown, and thereby the main purpose of the Bretton Woods 
system was to promote economic growth and development by providing a secure 
structure for economic activity.
332
  
Obviously, the idea that institutions are the rules of the game that shape the long-
term performance of economies has a long history. It is commonly associated with the 
name of Adam Smith who believed that favorable results can be obtained from 
decentralized institutions rather than centralized initiatives.
333
 However, the conservative 
school of neoliberal economic theory interpreted the Bretton Woods agreements, which 
originally sided with interventionist policies, very differently.
334
 The years of the post-
war American economic boom suspended Keynesian economic doctrine, based on the 
idea of a governments‟ having a responsibility to provide steady economic expansion, 
jobs and increasing standards of living, with the shortage of effective demand.
335
  
To be sure, the demand on the part of U.S. businesses significantly contributed to 
the persistence of the belief that only the unfettered market can guarantee the best 
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distribution of income and is the most effective instrument to foster economic 
development and social progress. Furthermore, when the U.S. economy was the largest 
and most powerful economy in the world, conservative neoliberal economics otherwise 
known as the Chicago School became highly influential and emphasized those aspects of 
the Bretton Woods agreements while favoring the U.S. interests and policies.
336
 Not only 
did the United States favor rules and norms for the conduct of postwar economic 
relations, but the U.S. dollar served as its major trading currency. Therefore, due to 
economic expansion and to enormous investments of the U.S. into Europe, provided by 
the Marshall Plan, the U.S. managed to occupy a hegemonic position and assumed the 
increasing responsibility for the capitalist stability in the world.
337
  
 Towards Neoliberal Hegemony 
It is essential to understand that mainly because of the United States‟ replacement 
of British hegemony over the capitalist world economy the nature of global capitalism 
has become quite different to that before the World War II. If there have been always 
hegemonic powers in the history of the modern world-system such as Spain, Portugal, 
United Provinces and the United Kingdom, the influence of the United States in the 
current capitalist order cannot be compared to that of any other mentioned above.
338
 The 
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and the shift to the role of the dollar as 
the international reserve currency has allowed the United States to obtain an economic 
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capability that was unparalleled.
339
 Furthermore, while claiming to foster liberty and 
prosperity, the United States evolved into the center of the world politics and culture.
340
 
 It was only after the Second World War, when U.S. recognized the reality of 
power relations in the world order and has started to intensively promote the ideal of 
itself as a model for the rest of the world.
341
 To be sure, the U.S. support for the 
Wilsonian ideals of self-determination, national sovereignty and democracy has won 
support for the power of the United States and has inspired progressive elements in many 
societies to affiliate with these ideals and seek closer ties with the United States.
342
 
Consequently, being the only industrial power that after the World War II possessed the 
diplomatic, economic and military strength, the United States initiated the process of 
shaping and managing postwar international relations according to America‟s ideas, 
practices and domestic interests. Finally, when economic, political and military center of 
world capitalism shifted to the United States, its longtime imperial aspirations for 
geopolitical expansion have found a renewed strength.  
The United States was committed to support the democratic development of 
societies. In order to secure its interests and solve the crisis of capital accumulation it 
launched the project of development. The case of post-World War II institutional 
transformation and construction of rules and regulations for the primacy of moving 
forward domestic interests of the Unites States is explained by Lipshutz, whose analysis 
has been associated with the notion of imperium as a heteronymous system subject to the 
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regulations originating from the single configuration of power and authority.
343
 Lipshutz 
is among those who argue that foreign policy of the United States should be viewed as an 
extension of its domestic commercial orientation. According to Lipshutz, the main reason 
for the United States to pressure European allies to grant their colonies independence and 
foster the process of national awakening was economic. Therefore, the post-war world 
order that was supposed to be built around the legitimacy of democracy and self-
determination was dictated by the commercial development and crave of the U.S. 
capitalist industrial system to capture markets, spheres of influences and capital 
investment. Clearly, the U.S. support for the right of self-determination was not based on 
the notions of fairness and idealism, but because of comprehensive planning and 




In the Cold War context and in the fear of being confronted against the forces that 
contributed to the erosion of European colonialism, the United States through the 
involvement of social scientists have managed to establish a universal view of human 
nature and produced core concepts and problem definitions with which global community 
should operate. As Michael Latham emphasizes, “responding to a perceived Communist 
threat in the midst of a collapsing European colonial order” a broad range of American 
scholars developed a modernization theory explaining why some countries succeeded in 
their economic development while others had not.
345
 Therefore, while modernization 
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refers to radical changes in political structures, social values and economic organization, 
it should be viewed as an ideology aiming to transform the world in the ways in which 
the security of the capitalist world would not be challenged.
346
 
  To be sure, Latham refers to modernization as a conceptual structure that clearly 
states “a common collection of assumptions about the nature of American society and its 
ability to transform a world perceived as both materially and culturally deficient.”
347
 In 
fact, the emphasis should be made that the process of modernization mostly meant the 
adoption of Western technology, development of an independent mass media and 
acceptance of Western culture and products, values of efficiency and professionalism.
348
 
In this context, Gill is clear that precisely the “outward expansion of the United States has 
also served to foster the values of consumerism and possessive individualism, so that 
increasing proportions of the populations of, for example, Third World states have come 
to identify with American culture.”
349
 Thus, vision of the entire world started to be 
transformed by Western techniques and institutions according to American model.  
Although in the previous chapter I examined the socio-political and economic 
aspects of development process, the main focus of the modernization theory has been a 
set of individual characteristics considered as necessary to economic growth and 
progress.
350
 While non-Western societies through its entire history felt a prejudice against 
profit, commerce, speculative investment and interest, these elements were encouraged to 
achieve a rising of standards of living and for the reconstruction of economies. Acting in 
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a self-interested way has started to be seen as a necessary to the social progress and 
development.
351
 From the modernization perspective, the only guarantee of progress is 
the cultivation of individuals with modern values, and having a state structure conducive 
to the development of free trade and commerce.
352
 Thus, economic growth has started to 
be considered as the work of rational and enterprising individual. In other words, “In the 
modernization school of thought, the individual is the center of social analysis and in 
many ways the sole reality, with society, state, and other forms of collective being.”
353
 
This viewing of progress via the individual behavior has been applied by knowledgeable 
experts and international institutions on the entire underdeveloped world.  
The general point is that in the predominant and mainstream Western political 
culture, resistance to the American expectation and position has been always judged to 
arise from the backwardness of the people, while support of Washington‟s policies has 
been regarded equivalent to democratic thinking and behavior.
354
 Of course, the 
improvements of the infrastructure, the accelerated spread of consumerism, technological 
innovation and industrialization have created feeling and belief in progress.
355
 In fact, an 
important aspect of modernization has always been its simultaneous benefit to the welfare 
of the underdeveloped state and highly industrialized capitalist economy.  Nevertheless, 
there should be clarity about the benefit in the relationship between the kind of post-
colonial state, serving the interests of capitalist marketing network, and economically 
developed and dominant nations, supplying with power, wealth and privilege a corrupt 
                                                          
351
 Ibid., 9-10.  
352
 Ibid., 14. 
353
 Ibid., 10. 
354
 Lamis Andoni, “Obama does not get it,” Al Jazeera, March 9, 2011, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/03/20113911948670383.html  (accessed March 9, 
2011). 
355
 Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism.   
121 
 
national elite that forfeits the well-being and dignity of the ordinary people.
356
 The 
demand for mutual benefit has depended on a level of threat to the capitalist elites of the 
globalized world and thereby “on an assertion of central imperial control.”
357
 
 For the U.S. political establishment, the rhetoric of self-determination, 
democracy, rule of law, anticommunism and human rights has been nothing else than a 
convenient instrument to arrange the structure of global capitalism in a way to converge 
with the U.S. interests. The pro-freedom and pro-justice slogans have had to grapple 
more with human consciousness than the physical structure and have worked to becloud 
the material quality of capitalist imperialism.
358
 Therefore, it should be immediately 
apparent that development as a largely national process has resembled the processes of 
colonial civilizing in which “a puppet ruler is installed, a native mercenary army hired to 
fight, and western troops sent to crush rebellious tribesmen who refuse to follow the 
diktat of the imperial power.”
359
 In this context, various and influential accounts that 
identify development with civilization, progress and modernization have been 
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C. The Consolidation of Neoliberal Hegemony 
Once Again, Crisis as a Starting Point 
Through the early 1970s, partly because of the socio-political responses to the 
effects of World War II, neoliberal doctrine hid under the umbrella of government policy. 
However, despite that modification, it is important to underline that the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates, capital controls and multilateral institutions “between the 
end of the Second World War and the start of the 1970s” allowed the largest development 
of productive structures and expansion of global economy in history.
361
 One of the 
reasons for such change is the fact that “the crisis of the post-war order accelerated the 
shift from Fordism to post-Fordism - from economies of scale to economies of 
flexibility.”
362
 In other words, “the large integrated plant employing large numbers of 
semiskilled workers on mass-production of standardised goods became an obsolete model 
of organisation.”
363
 This has significantly strengthened the power of capital within the 
production process and caused business to become less controllable by state authority.
364
 
Thus, while in the first half of the twentieth century liberal capitalism was interested in 
strengthening the role of the state to benefit corporations with legal privileges, tax 
benefits and financial investments, since the last decades of the twentieth century, the 
transnational corporations, through the implementation of neoliberal ideology, have been 
weakening the state and insisting on privatization of state enterprises. 
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The incorporation of monopolies in the production and financial sector has 
resulted in their taking over the state and turned for the world domination. In 1973, the 
switch to market-determined free exchange rates along with the oil price shock and 
subsequent prolonged international recession created favorable conditions for political 
leaders and leading economists to further push the free market ideology over Keynesian 
compromise. Slower rates of growth, intense social movements and high inflation across 
the world “laid the basis for the liberalization of finance and important changes in U.S. 
economic policy, which led to increased bank lending to the developing world in the 
1970s.”
365
 As a result, during the 1980s, being encouraged by Western banks to borrow, 
developing states were confronted with enormous debts and interest payments. Therefore, 
the resulting defaults and control of inflation helped to push further the agenda for a 
revived political approach which eventually came to be recognized as neoliberalism.
366
  
Ironically, the role of the IMF increased again. As Michael Barnett and Martha 
Finnemore stressed, “It has become very active in reconfiguring domestic political and 
business institutions of all kinds, advising countries on appropriate configurations of 
everything from their social spending to their stock markets and banking sectors.”
367
  For 
Barnett and Finnemore, the IMF started to intervene in member‟s income, labor, 
monetary, environmental and fiscal policies in ways generally rejected by its original 
architects. Barnett and Finnemore are clear that “The Fund moved from a limited focus 
on balance-of-payments lending to ever more sweeping structural interventions in 
member‟s economies and societies in an attempt to control activities that might contribute 
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 Nevertheless, the IMF‟s critics argue that these structural adjustment 
programs have not been merely a remedial package for stabilization and economic 
growth, but part of a scheme directed to reconstruct economies of the developing states 
according to the free market model.  
There cannot be any doubts that through the IMF‟s package of neoliberal 
structural adjustment policies as a condition for loans, neoliberalism, has imposed its 
market values and economic regime on weaker states.
369
 Neoliberal policy prescriptions 
imposed by the international agencies have forced developing states “to open their 
frontiers by lifting import and export restrictions, to remove price controls and state 
subsidies, to enforce rapid privatization or divestiture of all or part of state-owned 
enterprises, to implement user fees for basic services such as education and health and to 
cut social expenditures.”
370
 Thus, the widespread consensus in favor of economic 
liberalization was reached not only because of the failure of state interventionist policies 
during the period from the World War II through the 1980s, but as a result of intense 
campaign to spread a belief in the free market as the most effective way to foster 
economic growth and development by powerful international institutions such as the IMF 
and World Bank and known as the “Washington Consensus.” 
  Under the regimes of Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s undiluted neoliberal 
dogma rose to dominance and stimulated the spread of “transnational corporations, the 
expansion of foreign direct investment and the interpenetration of capital.”
371
 The 
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principal assertions of this dogma have become the ideas that “states should leave 
economies to the efficiencies of market forces” and were required to adopt such policies 
as free trade and privatization, deregulation and foreign investment.
372
 Hence, states 
became more accountable to business corporations rather than to the public. In fact, the 
role of state is now limited to that of a regulator of contracts between individuals and 
companies, and mediator of the conflict resulting from the class struggle.  
Therefore, the 1970s and 1980s have been characterized by the shift away from an 
international world order of sovereign states towards transnational liberal economic order 
in which multinational corporations have started to dominate.
373
 The key to the above 
developments have been a profound “changes in communication, information and 
transportation technologies that now enabled production to be globally parceled out.”
374
 
This in turn has allowed the relocation of the capitalist industrial production and 
eventually constituted the basis of a renewed cycle of capital accumulation, that is 
nowadays called globalization.  
Project of Neoliberal Globalization 
Though the relationship between the extension of neoliberalism and the process of 
globalization is vitally important, there is no doubt that both are tightly connected to the 
relationship of Western power.
375
 The concept of globalization has been used by free 
market theorists as liberalization and has been referred to as an accelerated integration of 
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many local economies into one global market.
376
 In this context, Kiely denies the 
assertion that contemporary globalization arrived from nowhere and claims that it should 
be seen as an outcome of the transition from a Keynesian to a neoliberal form of 
capitalism.
377
 Moreover, Keily is clear that in the process of transition and further 
extension of globalization the United States played a central role.
378
 Therefore, in spite of 
its new terminology, globalization is the formation and the outcome of a far longer 
intellectual history of promotion of markets for goods and for consolidating the global 
population in compliance with the forces operating in the free-market based capitalism.
379
  
If globalization began in the end of nineteenth century due to the military power 
and eventually slowed down during the interwar period, “in the late twentieth century, 
economic instruments, competition and cooperation” intensified and further extended the 
process of globalization.
380
 Current globalization is of a new kind; it is not English, but 
Anglo-American.
381
 To be precise, the crucial aspect of globalization is the 
comprehensive diffusion and supremacy of American capital and power.
382
 Just as the 
products of the United States have overflowed global markets since the post-World War 
II, American culture is now suffusing every continent.
383
 People everywhere are exposed 
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to the values of the United States as never before. U.S. brands are not simply selling 
products, but also a life-style.
384
 Furthermore, according to Robinson, “the global cultural 
icons symbolize the domination of a particular corporate capitalist culture.”
385
 We are 
witnessing how the U.S. political and business leaders, with the broad support of society, 
are imposing on the entire world the idea that American neoliberal values are universal 
and undeniable because they form the basis of civilization. Therefore, the consequences 
of a never-ending process of accumulating power and wealth, globalization should be 
referred to as an acceleration and triumph of the integrated capitalist system.
386
 At the 
same time, it should be obvious that the defining feature of the current capitalist epoch is 
the rise of transnational capital which aims at dominating the global market and generates 
pressures for cultural and political activities, with intense consequences for power 
relations.
387
 The spread of neoliberal knowledge structure has resulted in the further 
expansion of investments and markets, cutting the state sector and destruction of rights of 
indigenous peoples.  
Although the interconnectedness of individuals, groups and countries has existed 
for centuries and the increasing integration through trade has been a key characteristic of 
the global economy since the Second World War, namely the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the position of the United States as the leading beneficiary of the information 
revolution have leaded to the “spectacular growth in intensity, scope and visibility of 
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globalization as a public issue.”
388
 The Soviet Union fell and with it a new unipolar 
world, dominated by one master unchecked by any rival, was born. Having “conquered” 
and having put under the control the entire Western hemisphere, the United States 
received a green light for the access to the market of the post-Soviet republics that 
resulted in openness of the former communist state to American influence and power. 
The lack of prevalent strategic and ideological threat gave the United States free hand to 
pursue its foreign policy based on its interest.
389
 At the same time, it should be clear that 




The transition from the ideological confrontation to the consensus over the model 
of global economic and political management created a perfect moment and 
unprecedented opportunity for the United States to take a lead and change the 
international environment in the America‟s image. The fall of the Berlin Wall in late 
1989 and the culmination of the confrontation between traditional East and West left the 
world with illusion that the victory of liberal democratic capitalism was final.
391
 As a 
result of the “technological revolution involving the creation of a computerized network 
of communication,”
392
 the process of neoliberal globalization became a reality and has 
given an impression that all people from all the regions of the globe have been caught up 
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D. Neoliberal Triumph in Ukraine 
 The essential point is that for the majority of Ukrainian politicians the country‟s 
modernization and progress has been associated with Western neoliberal economic and 
political framework as the only legitimate path to restructure itself after decades of the 
communist rule. Since the declaration of Ukraine as an independent state, the neoliberal 
ideology has been central for the ruling class.
394
 In fact, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, former Communist party officials and Komsomol workers quickly equipped 
themselves with the knowledge of neoliberal political economy in exchange for the 
legitimization of their power and authority by the Western world.
395
 Furthermore, the 
experience of the Soviet centrally planned developmental strategy and the desire for 
individual liberty and equality before the law signified that Western political and 
socioeconomic model with an emphasis on private enterprise, consumerism, market 
economy and withdrawal of the state has presented an attractive picture to the 
populations in Eastern Europe.
396
 Therefore, with the end of the ideological battle in the 
context of Cold War, the idea of the development by replacing “backward” practices with 
Western norms and institutions has been greeted with euphoria by the countries of 
Eastern Europe.  
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After the series of external shocks crested with the spectacular collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the fundamental institutional change in development strategy, greater 
openness to trade, and complete deregulation of the financial system have become the 
essential preconditions to successful stabilization and adjustment processes in Eastern 
Europe.  It has been widely accepted that through economic growth and modernization in 
the overwhelmingly Western-centric vision or more specifically in the American image, 
social inequalities and the Soviet way of life would be eliminated. Furthermore, the 
political conditionality, tied to Western financial aid which has been imposed on the 
former communist countries, left little choice but to adopt the program of radical political 
and socioeconomic policies associated with capitalist development and democratic, as 
opposed to authoritarian, form of government.
397
 
Consequently, it is apparent that while domestic transition dynamics of the 
countries of Eastern Bloc has differed in size and intensity, the vision of Western-led 
development model for such countries as Ukraine has resulted from domestic demands 
and international pressures.
398
 Importantly, while the process of modernization within 
Central and Eastern Europe has targeted not only communist political and socioeconomic 
system but also the Soviet Union,
399
 it has deepened the problem of Ukraine‟s national 
identity, and thereby has delayed a structural change in economic and sociopolitical life 
of Ukrainians. Nevertheless, current Ukrainian political establishment continues to view 
Western neoliberal model of development as the only legitimate path to progress, and 
                                                          
397
 Ibid.  
398
 Reimund Seidelmann, “Western and Eastern Europe After the East-West Conflict: Reinventing 
Responsibility and a Grand Strategy,” in NATO for a New Century: Atlanticism and European Security, ed. 
Carl C. Hodge (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 51.   
399
 Ibid., 53. 
131 
 
gradually transforms politics and economy of the country in a top-down manner 
according to the prescriptions of the Western world.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to acknowledge that a part of the reason that the 
nature of neoliberal reforms in Ukraine was always half-hearted is the fact that none of 
the Ukrainian political forces possessed an absolute power.
400
 In point of fact, both Mr. 
Kuchma and Mr. Yushchenko while trying to balance between the needs of big capital 
and public sentiments were not able to fully implement neoliberal economic policy 
reforms.
401
 For Yuriy Romanenko, the victory of Yanukovych in 2010 Ukrainian 
presidential election marks the radical shift towards neoliberal structural policy. Having 
succeeded in the allocation of maximum concentration of powers in one institution, 
Yanukovych's regime, under the guise of “tough measures to restore order” has made a 
commitment to neoliberalism as the dominant ideology and political stance.
402
  
The neoliberal offensive in Ukraine which began with the advent of Yanukovych 
is entirely logical in the context of achieving a non-violent solution to the political crisis 
in Ukraine.
403
 Since Yanukovych‟s arrival happened at the time of global economic 
crisis, any government‟s actions could be perceived as a necessity to protect a common 
good.
404
 In this context, referring to Milton Friedman, Romanenko underlines that only 
crisis could lead to real change in Ukraine. Specifically, through exploitation of crisis 
conditions and managing opposition, Yanukovych‟s government has initiated economic 
reform policies.  
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As a result, Yanukovych released the program of economic reforms for 2010-
2014 which comprehensively defines an application of neoliberal economic agenda. In 
fact, the systematic reform program, which according to Ukrainian mass-media was 
developed by McKinsey & Company, consists of the pension and tax reforms, reform of 
the labor code and many other programs of economic reforms which have been written 
on the prescription of IMF, and more important, as a precondition for IMF financial aid. 
In short, this program envisages raised living standards, improved growth performance 
and more transparency through complete privatization and liberalization, deregulation 
and fiscal decentralization, complete reformation of public services. 
NATO as a Dutiful Agent of Neoliberalism 
While the IMF and World Bank have been the most powerful advocates of 
neoliberal reforms in the developing world over the last three decades, NATO, WTO and 
the European Central Bank joined the race to spread neoliberalism shortly after the 
collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. If Central and Eastern Europe‟s 
integration into the Western Alliance‟s institutional framework was recently 
accomplished and consolidated, Ukraine‟s reorientation has attained an advanced stage in 
the economic and political spheres.  
Rachel Epstein argues that international institutions have had a significant 
influence on post communist countries which have set themselves on a free market 
reform trajectory.
405
 According to Epsein, the liberal, or as I call it neoliberal, worldview 
that currently prevails in the minds of political and economic elites of Eastern and Central 
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Europe is supported “by a perception of where authority is grounded.”
406
 For most parts 
of Eastern and Central Europe, the transition to political pluralism and free market 
enterprise “has been marked by a shift from domestic sources of authority, such as 
historical experience and nationalist striving to international sources of authority, such as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Bretton Woods 
institutions.”
407
 Epstein‟s claim that “Domestic actors view international institutions as 




International institutions not only exercise power over policymaking elites and 
consequently determine an international orientation of states, they also influence the 
“domestic balance of power among groups in society.”
409
 International institutions, 
whose main priority is to develop new policy programs, persuade and shape the actions 
of domestic actors and should be viewed as active agents of domestic and global 
change.
410
 While I realize that a number of different theoretical approaches can be 
relevant for the evaluation of the role of the state in today‟s internationalized world and 
extremely useful for our understanding of how international institutions and regimes can 
transform political dynamics, this section attempts only to highlight the point that 
international organizations have promoted consensus around the neoliberal policy 
manifestations in the countries undergoing transition. More important, the point is that 
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multilateral institutions play a key role in regional and global processes of monitoring 
and implementation of free market-oriented knowledge structure while disciplining 
alternative knowledge, ideas, policy options, and practices.  
As previously mentioned, for Ukraine, Euro-Atlantic integration means not only 
being a member of collective security system, but fostering of economic development 
through a neoliberal political and constitutional framework.  If for Walt, Ukraine‟s 
participation in the transatlantic cooperative security arrangement can increase the state‟s 
strength in relation to Russia and enhance its regional influence, according to Brett 
Leed‟s and Andrew Long‟s hypothesis, Euro-Atlantic integration means more for 
Ukraine than just being an associate of military organization.
411
 Leeds and Long assert 
that military allies unconditionally have positive economic consequences, and members 
of the collective security system are expected to facilitate economic growth, development 
and trade.
412
 For scholars, the security externality and the reaction of commercial 
institutions are the main motives and explanations for intensive engagement in 
mercantilism. Leeds and Long conclude that “When firms feel secure that conflict 
between their state and that of their trading partners is unlikely to occur and that the states 
will work together to promote commerce between their respective businesses, they are 
more likely to invest in trade.”
413
  
As determined by the liberalist theoretical perspective of international relations, 
Ukraine‟s membership in NATO will provide a well-balanced and secure framework for 
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regional and international economic activity, and thereby will encourage close trading 
relationships and reassure the international community that economic cooperation 
remains safe. Namely, the liberal view with its ideas of complex interdependence and 
functionalism ascribes to NATO a crucial role in driving states to collaborate in a much 
more widespread way than they had done before. Liberal explanations for the 
incorporation of Ukraine into NATO derive from the idea that all states are bound to 
benefit from interdependency and cooperation. This argument stresses that while NATO 
reduces the threat for nascent democracies and thereby promotes and extends the liberal 
community, the Alliance also continues to play a security role. Liberal scholars see 
NATO as one of many multilateral mechanisms to promote security and transnational 
cooperation through reinforcing democracy and free market economies. In fact, my point 
is that the only arguments which demonstrate security advantages for Ukraine joining 
NATO seem to rely more on particular Wilsonian liberal internationalism or 
constructivist notions about the constitutive role of alliances rather than realist 
conventional wisdom.  
According to Epstein, countries who are not even members of the Alliance yet, 
but have joined the path to its membership, already demonstrate their devotion to 
Western political and economic models. Through the Partnership for Peace, a program 
directed at creating trust between NATO and non-members, a process of 
denationalization of defense planning and foreign policy in majority of countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe has already taken place.
414
 Furthermore, while the 
partnership commits to extend defense cooperation between a non-member state and the 
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Alliance, it pushes a cooperative non-member state to transform power relations from an 
executive-led model to a model of democratic civil-military relations.
415
 One of the main 
focuses of NATO has always been the establishment of “a system of check and balances 
in which the executive, government, parliament, and society, through the media and 
nongovernmental organizations would share in oversight.”
416
 Moreover, particular 
transformations in defense will not only lead to further distributional consequences, but 
signify a transformation of “previously contested ideas into commonly held 
assumptions.”
417
 It follows, therefore that NATO uses its membership requirements not 
only to regulate the behavior of societies, but also to define new tasks, create new 
categories of actors and shape social reality in ways that favor a market-oriented 
approach. 
  Alexandra Gheciu‟s book NATO in the “New Europe” The Politics of 
International Socialization After the Cold War is an analytical examination of NATO‟s 
role in building of construction of Western liberal norms and practices in former 
Communist states. While analyzing the practices of NATO in Eastern and Central 
Europe, Gheciu argues that NATO has been deeply involved in socializing “Central and 
Eastern European political, military, and functional elites into adopting Western-defined 
liberal democratic norms and building corresponding institutions in their states.”
418
 
Through NATO‟s involvement in the numerous processes of domestic politics, the 
organization has “played an important role in post-Communist efforts in Central and 
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Eastern Europe to (re) draw boundaries between reasonable/unacceptable definitions of 
national identity and interests”
419
 While Gheciu unifies a great number of arguments that 
are useful for my study, the claim that NATO has been deeply engaged in a relatively 
broad set of activities aimed at projection of a particular kind of liberal state identity in 
Central and Eastern Europe, “while simultaneously rejecting alternative norms and 




In summary, it should be clear that the process of decolonization ended the 
process of the extension of power though conquest and led to the major transformations 
in the form of capitalist imperialism. The United States, a unique country “in the degree 
of its reliance on military spending, and its determination to beside the world, military as 
well as economically,”
421
 established not only the renewed cycle of capital accumulation, 
but a new form of social control and discipline. The chapter has sought to demonstrate 
that the Bretton Woods system was designed to drive states into consensus that global 
economic and social development should be based around market-based principles. More 
important, it should be apparent that the post-war order was organized to promote a 
regime, associated with the classical liberalism, in which the notions of complex 
interdependence and integration were highly suggestive in order to improve living 
standards and promote rapid economic growth. This chapter also briefly examined the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and marked it as a shift to economic globalization 
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associated with the widespread implementation of the free market doctrines, known as 
neoliberalism. 
International institutions have become significantly necessary instruments for 
maintaining international economic and political order.  Through the engagement 
particularly with the liberal pluralist perspectives, I examine international institutions as 
the instruments to promote the neoliberal policies of privatization, liberalization and 
deregulation. My main argument here is that markets are expanded and produced with the 
help of international organizations. It should be clear that international institutions, such 
as NATO, IMF, WTO, and World Bank impose the limitations on socio-economic and 
political life of states to promote neoliberalism as Western model of economic 
development and thereby deprive of any other achievable policy alternatives.  
As for Ukraine‟s membership in NATO specifically, I argue that while it has 
always been a protector of capitalist liberal order, with the end of the Cold War the 
Alliance has become an active and important tool in the process of post communist 
transition.  I agree with the viewpoint that through a series of “mechanisms of teaching 
and persuasion,” NATO continues to be deeply involved in promotion of Western-style 
liberal political and economic norms.
422
 As Gheciu concluded, NATO, “conventionally 
regarded as just a military alliance, which, by definition, would not become involved in 
domestic politics” should be seen as one of the leading agents in the international 
socialization process aiming to shape public opinion and reconstruct domestic politics.
423
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In short, the arguments taken up by Epstein and Gheciu, led me to conclude that 
engagement with NATO plays a significant role in the formulation of state interests and 
even definition of national identity. I argue that in close engagement with NATO, the 
Western states consider domestic reforms as instruments of establishing a neoliberal 
model of development in the transition countries. Logically, this means that membership 
in NATO signifies a subscription to Anglo-American neoliberal economic model, 
imposed by the Western World. Given this context, it is vitally necessary to think that 
Ukraine‟s membership in NATO demands a resignation of Ukrainian sovereignty in the 
realms of foreign and domestic policy. This discussion contributes to the argument that 
an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine‟s security 












VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The significant part of Ukraine‟s identity problem emerged out of its historical 
context. Historically, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine were under the Russian 
empire and western Ukraine at times was a part of Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland. More important, Ukrainians lived not only in 
various political entities, but also in very different cultural systems which developed on 
the basis of Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches. While eastern Ukrainians 
speak Russian, the people of western Ukraine, on the other hand, speak Ukrainian. Only 
after World War II, with the end of prolonged conflict between western Ukrainians and 
Poles, Ukraine established its present-day borders as a republic within the Soviet Union. 
In 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence there were predictions that Ukraine 
would break up the way of Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, while being 
hardly a well-integrated country, Ukraine continues its existence as an independent and 
unexpected state that many are still adjusting to.
424
  
Ukraine is not strictly speaking a national state. Rather it is a unique multinational 
and multicultural state in which the Russian presence has been extremely large. 
Previously oppressed different cultural traditions “entered the conceptual space of 
identity debate” and created an equilibrium which implies the absence of unilateral 
colonial pressure.
425
 For some it may be an exaggeration, but I am suggesting that 
Ukrainian state serves as a good example of the artificially constructed state consisting of 
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different peoples whose integration into one political group emerged rather recently. 
Thus, the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state resulted in the underlying dispute 
over the question of what it means to be Ukrainian.  
The search for a Ukrainian identity rests on a conflict between the eastern cultural 
tradition, which attaches values of the connection between Russians and Ukrainians, and 
western cultural tradition, which privileges Ukraine‟s Western identity. In the debate over 
cultural affiliation of Ukraine it does not matter which of these cultures are better.  The 
problem is that Western and Eurasian political cultures are different and not compatible. 
Following Jeffrey Hahn, I am referring political culture to the values, beliefs, and 
attitudes about political life which society holds and which, through “an intergenerational 
transfer known as the process of political socialization,” constitute an integral part of 
person‟s social identity.
426
 In fact, it is necessary to emphasize that the notion of 
“Eurasia” in this work is not referred to the assembly of the continents of Europe and 
Asia, but as Dmitri Trenin notes, it is addressed to the “traditional Russian state - the 
stardom of Muscovy, the empire, the Soviet Union.”
427
 To explore this issue further, 
Molchanov makes it clear that “Eurasianism emphasizes the conservative side of Russian 
political culture, elevating the state over society and defending impersonal „order‟ against 
the „anarchic‟ impulses of individual freedom.”
428
 Arguing for the pro-Eurasian ideology 
of Ukraine‟s foreign policy, its proponents are clear that such a political culture is 
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contradictory to a kind of “liberalism” and “democracy” that Western political culture 
advances.  
Although the debate over Ukraine‟s integration in NATO covers mainly such 
issues as the enhancement of state security, modernization of armed forces, and 
improvement of military performance, NATO membership for Ukraine is a part of the 
process of nurturing Ukraine‟s Western self-conception and demonstrates Ukraine‟s 
commitment to the process of integration into Western institutions. According to Paul 
D‟Anieri, “even if Ukraine is never admitted to NATO but establishes NATO 
membership as a goal, then something new has been said about Ukrainian national 
identity.”
429
 In fact, the issue of Ukraine‟s integration into NATO for the majority of 
Ukrainian population involves not the point of a return to Europe or Western civilization, 
but a matter of changing dimensions of Ukrainian society along the structure of 
civilization.  Therefore, it should be clear that NATO is playing a crucial role in 
influencing Ukrainian political culture and political environment.  
Pro-NATO forces in Ukraine have portrayed the Alliance mostly in military 
terms, and argued that strengthening of Ukraine‟s position vis-à-vis Russia and protection 
against a possible Russian threat is the main value of NATO membership for Ukraine. I 
have argued that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by 
Ukraine‟s security concerns. Obviously, Ukrainian society has had a long history of 
Soviet rule and domination. Russian influence on Ukraine has always been evident. 
However, I assert that most of political, economic and cultural tensions between Ukraine 
and Russia are artificial and in most cases mean to mobilize certain fractions of electorate 
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and to discredit the political opponents. While I acknowledge that “the Ukrainian-Russian 
cultural war is part of a wider on-going undeclared conflict between both countries over 
their evolving national identities,” it must be clear that the disputes and differences over 
national identity have always been chronically used in Ukraine‟s elections at all levels.
430
 
It is also true that Russia used its energy resources to influence Ukrainian policies.
431
 
However, as Anton Fedyashin argues, “Since Russia has subsidized Ukraine's economy 
by selling it gas below market prices, it was well within its rights to expect cooperation in 
return.”
432
  With regard to Ukraine‟s pro-Western course, it is interesting to note that 
“Russia has never objected to Ukraine's participation in the EU, the OECD, or any other 
non-military Western institution.”
433
 This is probably because prospect of Ukraine 
actually joining these Western institutions has remained a long way off. 
The question of Ukrainian membership in NATO has always been influenced by 
historical and ideological factors which in recent years have become the main electoral 
motivations of the Ukrainian highly polarized society.
434
 Unfortunately, following the 
election of Yushchenko, the problems only intensified and manipulation of public 
opinion has became a live issue as never before. Clearly, Yushchenko reduced Ukraine‟s 
Western orientation to NATO membership and depicted his anti-Russian policy as the 
expression of Ukrainian patriotism.
435
 In the absence of Russian threat and due to the lack 
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of spectacularity of Ukrainian-Russian antagonism the security approach was determined 
for a failure as a conceivable reason for Ukraine‟s incorporation in the military Alliance. 
Therefore, the perception of a Russian threat served to be the central argumentative 
strategy of the former Ukrainian government to bring Ukraine into NATO.  
Nevertheless, while in the public sphere the balance-of-threat served a largely 
convincing explanation for Ukraine to be incorporated into NATO, in practice the 
security concerns have resulted to be nothing else than a part of rhetorical action to 
persuade the opponents of Ukraine‟s incorporation in NATO. Active pulling of Ukraine 
into NATO, grounded on security concerns and motivated by the fear of the enemy, 
brought the opposite effects which seem to be neither overlooked by the former U.S. 
leadership nor by the former Ukrainian president. Once again, this happened because of 
the neorealist argumentative strategy of Yushchenko that was completely different from 
the rhetorical strategy of the leaders of Central and Eastern European states who along 
with security concerns appealed to the Western liberal principles of social and political 
order. Relying on Schimmelfennig‟s analysis it is clear that the perception of security 




Furthermore, identification with the Western international community and the 
perception of liberal democratic norms as legitimate are sufficient preconditions for 
NATO's decision to admit new members.
437
 While Central and Eastern European states 
have always identified themselves positively with Western international community, 
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perceived Western liberal norms as legitimate and eventually integrated into NATO and 
the European Union, for such countries as Ukraine positive identification with the 
Western community is not enough. The process of integration into NATO or the 
European Union requires the transformation of Ukrainian identity in turn which is 
problematic for both Ukraine and Russia. Attempts to speedily shift the construction of 
Ukrainian identity in the pro-Western direction during the presidency of Yushchenko 
have significantly contributed to the political instability and further division in Ukrainian 
society.  
Therefore, the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO while excluding Russia would 
decrease rather than increase not only Ukraine‟s security, but also Europe‟s security.  
With Ukraine‟s incorporation into military alliance , the great danger is that Russia will 
be trapped in a security dilemma what in its turn will force Russian policymakers to 
adopt more hostile attitude not only towards Ukraine, but also towards organization in 
general. Russia would have every reason to view Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO as a 
threat, especially given the geographical position of its Black Sea Fleet. In these 
circumstances, it is apparent that an effort to turn Ukraine into North-Atlantic military 
ally would lead to potentially negative consequences in Europe and beyond. Moreover, 
the Crimean question would never go away just because Ukraine joins NATO.  
Consequently, the conclusion that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member 
is not driven by Ukraine‟s security concerns flows logically. NATO is the organization of 
the Western community which pursues a strategy of transforming the values, rules and 
norms of the Western neoliberal capitalism into “domestic institutions and discourses that 
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effectively govern domestic and foreign policy-making.”
438
 Seen from 
Schimmelfenning‟s perspective, membership in NATO signifies the affirmation of a 
Western political and socio-economic model against competing alternatives in both 
domestic and international arena.
439
  
I have argued that the extension of NATO should be seen as an extension of 
multiple forms of power and influence, and the issue of Ukraine joining Euro-Atlantic 
Alliance should be examined in the context of the U.S. strategic interests. If states, 
according to realists, are considered to be the only entities in the system of international 
relations, then it is obvious that NATO should be examined as a tool for advancing of 
agent‟s state interests. Why is it in the interests of the U.S. to contribute huge proportions 
of resources to group undertaking and back NATO‟s membership for the weak and 
unstable states?
440
 This work contributes to the idea that NATO should be seen as 
multilateral organization which reinforces and promotes a global governance system, 
aiming at the establishment and consolidation of capitalist international order under the 
supervision of the United States. Taking the argument a step further, being a multilateral 
organization, NATO‟s norms and rules have been applied to reinforce the process of 
transnational class formation, linked to globalized patterns of production and distribution, 
which  in its turn are tied to the interests of U.S. corporations.  
It has been argued that in the second half of the twentieth century the world 
capitalism entered the new phase of accumulating wealth and power in which 
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international organizations have played a significant role in support for the needs of the 
capitalist mode of production. Except until the Second World War, the United States has 
considered itself to be the heir to Western civilization with the responsibility for 
defending the West against the enemies.
441
 Following the end of the Second World War, 
Western imperialist camp, guided by the United States, became the decisive force in the 
system of international relations. The highest priority of the U.S. political establishment 
has become to reform the manufacturing, business and commercial world along lines that 
would absorb U.S. manufacturing surpluses and offer opportunities for investment.
442
 A 
new world order, constructed through such institutions as the United Nations, the IMF, 
the World Bank, was to be subordinated to the needs of the U.S. economy and subjected 
to U.S. political control.  
In contrast to the common view that is constructed on the concepts of rhetoric, the 
United States‟ foreign policy originated directly from domestic policy and its main goal 
has always been to center commercial interests.
443
 The domestic market of the United 
States required constant economic growth, with rising profits and full employment, 
required investment abroad and growth of trade.
444
 As a result, “the finance oligarchy 
involved the state in national economic planning and implicated it in the process of 
economic and military competition with the dominant classes of other societies.”
445
 State 
monopoly capitalism that replaced laissez-faire state has started to use its power to force 
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weaker states to allow entry of its goods into their markets, and has forced states to 
accept unfavorable terms of trade.
446
 The struggle for monopoly power has become the 
dynamic principle in the U.S. foreign policy.
447
  
The existence of the Soviet threat helped to unite capitalist powers into the U.S.-
led military alliance, and thereby enforced U.S. hegemony.
448
 Security became the excuse 
for Europe, Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand to agree to military and 
economic integration with the United States.
449
 This point gives rise to the claim that the 
supremacy in the security structure is most significant to the supporting of capitalist 
hegemony.
450
 Gill is clear that while we can speak of Australia, Japan or Europe as major 
economic challengers, their dependence on the United States for their security signifies 
that those actors are subordinated.
451
 Here I join Lipschutz, who comments that “for the 
United States in particular, the importance of the Soviet Bloc lay in its real or imagined 
threat to Western capitalism as a system.”
452
 The confrontation between two superpowers 
has allowed the United States in a relatively short period of time to plan a global military 
strategy, “dividing the planet into regions and allocating the responsibility for the control 
of each of them to a U.S. Military command.”
453
 It follows from this that the main goal of 
the U.S. military agenda has been to maintain the U.S. hegemony, act as the police 
officer, and make sure that there would not appear a player in the system of international 
relations that can challenge U.S. militarily and economically.  
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In fact, according to Aleksandr Dugin, we are dealing with a new form of 
Westernization, that in different ways “passed by Roman Empire, Medieval Christianity, 
the Modernity (with the Enlightenment and colonization) and up to present day 
postmodernism and ultra-individualism.” The bad news is that the historical existence of 
the U.S. goes simultaneously with the course of the human history, and the gap between 
the devotion to the promotion of justice and the reality of the U.S. foreign policy 
objectives is tremendous.
454
 As Andrew Bacevich correctly points out, “From the earliest 
days of the Cold War the United States entertained a strategic vision that looked well 
beyond the imperative of defending the world against communist aggression.”
455
 My 
point is that the promotion of neoliberalism has initially been in the U.S. interests and has 
had nothing to do with global social justice and economic growth.  
From Wallerstein‟s analysis it is clear not only that the concept of state is 
constructed to perform a number of roles which are vital for a capitalist economic 
growth, but more important for my argument is the notion that the economic structure of 
capitalism for its successful functioning requires the existence of dominant ideologies or 
belief systems. Namely the “crisis in state-led development in the Third World and the 
discrediting of the Soviet-based left” led to the extraordinary degree of global consensus 
over the adoption of free market-oriented reforms, promoted by the global institutions 
and the most powerful state actors.
456
  However, the claims of the experts of international 
institutions that everyone would benefit from the model of export-oriented manufacturing 
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That very process of globalization with its pop-culture, technological innovation 
and consumerism which jointly have contributed to the feeling of constant development 
and progress distracted people from understanding the true nature of exploitation and 
oppression that the majority of the world‟s population has been experiencing. As George 
puts it, “Rather than encompassing everyone in a collective march towards a better life, 
globalization is a process that allows the world market economy to take the best and 
leave the rest.”
458
 Nowadays, subordination of social groups in capitalist globalized world 
is based on the extraction of consent which implies the global spread of consumerist 
culture and power of democracy. A point that has to be kept in mind is that these are the 
instruments by which bourgeoisie ruling class maintains its capitalist hegemony. I am 
convinced that the key to understanding and appreciation of globalization is to 
conceptually keep the globalization as a “politico-economic project” distinct from 
globalization as a “techno-cultural process.”
459
 While globalization entails both capitalist 
markets and flows of technology, people, ideas and culture “across national boundaries 
via a global networked society,”
460
 it represents itself as a counterpart of the U.S. foreign 
policy which is either economic policy or consists of instructing the world in American 
virtues. 
                                                          
457




 Adopted from Booth, Theory of World Security, 361.  
See also Kellner, “Theorizing Globalization,”285-286.  
460
 Kellner, “Theorizing Globalization,”287. 
151 
 
According to modernization theory, societal development and economic growth 
of the newly established states such as Ukraine or Slovenia should take place through the 
application of neoliberal economic mechanisms and democratic consolidation. While the 
postwar planners designed national and international economic order on the basis of the 
ideas of John Keynes, who argued for state interference in the economy and provision of 
goods and services to a national population, current political and economic establishment 
is pushing for a neoliberalism as a new liberal orthodoxy associated with the market-
driven approach based on classical liberal policies and favoring a minimal role of the 
state.  Thus, if during the 1960‟s the development doctrine was dominated by the 
conception of economic ideology centered on the important role of both the government 
and market, in the present years the political economy of modernization approach has 
relied heavily on the role of international institutions and free market as an engine of 
development and progress.
461
 To estimate the  radical change in political and economic 
thought, George makes it clear that if in 1945 or 1950 someone had proposed that the 
government should diminish its role in the economy or that society should be given much 
less than social protection, he or she would have been called insane.
462
  
Today, markets are seen to be a better way of organizing not only an economic 
activity, but are tightly linked to a policy of social and political arrangement. More 
important, the neoliberal view of development, based on economic growth through free 
market economies and free trade, has supplanted all other prospects for economic 
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practice and continues to deprive any other regional alternatives toward development 
policies.
463
As Arturo Escobar writes, “The total opening of the economy – coupled with a 
new round of privatization of the state - has become the order of the day.”
464
 In fact, any 
political and economic activity that might interact with liberalization of trade and finance, 
privatization and deregulation is automatically questionable and causes suspicion because 
it seems to interact with the mechanisms of the free market, which is seen as the most 




As culture along with ideology advance from the national to the international 
levels, they become institutionalized in organizations such as NATO.
466
 If after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, discussions in the 1990s often rotated around “whether 
NATO would, could or should survive, they now centre around the implications of its 
centrality, and its current and future enlargement.”
467
 The questions of how and why the 
military alliance survived after the end of the Cold War directs attention of the scholars to 
the redefinition of NATO‟s traditional mission and purpose. The extension of the zone of 
NATO eastward has been viewed from the standpoint of geopolitical interests and should 
be regarded as an ideological measure. If it was not so why then the integration of Russia 
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into a Western concert had not occurred and how the NATO expansion into East-Central 
Europe, despite the agreement between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 
against the enlargement of NATO, can be explained.
468
 
I have demonstrated that NATO should be viewed not as a measure to maintain 
regional stability, but as an instrument to promote a hegemonic neoliberal hegemony. The 
argument I developed above considers neoliberalism as a modernization project of the 
capitalist elites, based on the exercise of global power and directed by the imperatives of 
the international accumulation of capital.
469
 Therefore, NATO is one of the numerous 
transnational social forces working to maintain the essentials of the global system of 
capitalism through transforming Central and East European societies. Finally, Ukrainian 
membership in NATO will signify the consolidation hegemonic ideology in Ukraine.  
I argue that Ukraine, being situated in the zone between West and East, should not 
rely on NATO to guarantee its state security, in particular at the expense of Ukraine-
Russia relationship. Furthermore, I consider the idea that NATO cannot maintain its 
status of collective security arrangement unless the role of the European Union and 
Russia in the European security arrangement is equal to the role of the United States, and 
“unless it admits virtually all European nations – which would make it nearly congruent 
with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.”
470
 However, while 
examining NATO in the context of the Western extension of power, I argue that Ukraine 
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should be a non-aligned state, and its geographical position provides a special advantage 
for Ukraine to develop itself as a powerful regional player.  
In this work, I underline the importance of the government of Ukraine to conduct 
both domestic and foreign policies in the interest of the citizens of the country. I appeal 
not to look for the ways to raise the standards of people‟s lives according to Russian or 
Western prescriptions, but to follow the pragmatic, open-minded and independent 
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